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THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE: IMMIGRATION RULES AND
THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR SAME-SEX SPOUSES IN A
WORLD WITHOUT DOMA
SCOTT C. TITSHAW*
ABSTRACT
An estimated 35,000 U.S. citizens are living in our country with
same-sex foreign partners, but these couples have no right to stay here
together on the basis of their relationship. Many of these Americans
are faced with a choice between their partners and the country they
love. This is true even if the couple is legally married in one of the
growing number of U.S. states and foreign countries that recognize
same-sex marriage. The Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), which
defines “marriage” for all federal purposes as an exclusively hetero-
sexual institution, stands squarely in their way.
Reform options that would help these couples stay together in
the United States include a judicial determination that marriage
discrimination violates the U.S. Constitution, federal legislation spe-
cifically recognizing these couples under U.S. immigration law, and
the repeal or striking down of DOMA. This article focuses on the
latter possibility.
Repealing or striking down DOMA would not necessarily result
in a clear, uniform rule recognizing all same-sex marriages under the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). There is, however, a wealth
of guidance about how our immigration system deals with marriages
that are recognized in some, but not all, U.S. states. This article maps
out the legal terrain that would remain in an immigration world
without DOMA.
U.S. immigration cases involving marriage validity have been
decided in a piecemeal, case-specific manner. A systematic review of
the case law, however, reveals that U.S. Attorneys General, the Board
of Immigration Appeals (BIA), immigration officials, and most federal
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courts have consistently applied the same standards to determine
marriage validity under the INA. These standards have been em-
ployed in dozens of cases involving biracial marriage, marriage be-
tween close relatives, marriage involving minors, marriage involving
transgender spouses, proxy marriage, polygamy, and even same-sex
marriage before DOMA.
After distilling and describing a three-step test that embodies the
well-established rules for dealing with disputed categories of mar-
riage, this article applies this analysis to same-sex spouses whose
marriages are recognized by a U.S. state or a foreign country. It iden-
tifies some answers and illuminates possible approaches to a few hard
questions that would remain.
INTRODUCTION
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “MARRIAGE” UNDER THE INA
II. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE
UNDER THE INA
A. Three Steps to Marriage Recognition Under the INA
B. The Rules for Assessing Whether Public Policy Warrants
an Exception to the General Rule Favoring Marriage
Recognition
1. Strong Public Policy Exceptions of a Couple’s State of
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2. Federal Immigration Policy Exceptions to Marriage
Recognition
C. Federal Law Frequently Relies on State Law to Determine
Status Within State Purview
III. ANALYZING WHETHER A MARRIAGE IS A “MARRIAGE” UNDER
THE INA
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1. Meeting Procedural Marriage Requirements
2. Celebration Without a Ceremony: Common Law
Marriage
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V. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RECOGNITION UNDER THE INA IF DOMA
IS REPEALED OR STRUCK DOWN
A. States of Domicile Without Mini-DOMAs or
Constitutional Marriage Amendments
B. States with Mini-DOMAs or Constitutional Marriage
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A. The Proposed Uniting American Families Act
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Discrimination in General
CONCLUSION
INTRODUCTION
The mayor of this West Texas sheep ranching town
offered a stunning explanation when he suddenly
resigned: He was in love with a man who was an
illegal immigrant and had gone to Mexico.
They had to move, he said, because there was no
legal way for them to remain together in the United
States.
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“It wasn’t a decision that any U.S. citizen should
have to make,” former Mayor J.W. Lown said in an
interview from Mexico. “I left a home. I left a ranch.
I left a promising political career.”
His local prominence and his run for the border on
the day he was supposed to be sworn in for a fourth
term caused jaws to drop, but it also became a high-
profile example of the thousands of Americans who
face a similar choice — separate or move abroad —
because they can’t secure green cards for their part-
ners like heterosexual spouses can.1
An estimated 35,000 U.S. citizens are living here with foreign
same-sex partners, and many are faced with the same choice as
Mayor Lown because their relationships are not recognized under
federal immigration law.2 This is true even if the couples were legally
married in one of the nine foreign countries3 or seven U.S. jurisdic-
tions that have licensed marriages for same-sex couples.4
1. Michelle Roberts, Gay Couples Forced to Flee U.S. over Immigration Law,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, June 10, 2009, http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/nation/6469222
.html.
2. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & IMMIGRATION EQUALITY, FAMILY, UNVALUED: DISCRIMI-
NATION, DENIAL, AND THE FATE OF BINATIONAL SAME-SEX COUPLES UNDER U.S. LAW 7
(2006), http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/FamilyUnvalued.pdf [hereinafter
FAMILY, UNVALUED] (basing calculations on the 2000 census estimate of 35,820 such
couples). This may be a slight overestimate, however, because the number also appears
to include same-sex couples in the United States consisting of two foreign nationals. Id.
at 173.
3. Currently the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain, Canada, South Africa, Norway, and
Sweden offer full marriage equality to same-sex couples. Freedom to Marry, International
Progress Toward the Freedom to Marry (Apr. 2009), http://www.freedomtomarry.org/get
_informed/marriage_basics/history/international_progress.php. Buenos Aires, Argentina,
and Mexico City also now recognize same-sex marriage within their jurisdictions.
Associated Press, Marriage License is Granted to Argentine Gay Couple, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 17, 2009, at A10; Anne-Marie O’Connor, With Gay Marriage Law, Mexico City
Enters Fray, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2010, at A8.
4. Five states currently issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples: Massachusetts,
Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont, and New Hampshire. See Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health,
957 A.2d 407, 481-82 (Conn. 2008) (recognizing the statutory ban on same-sex couples
as unconstitutional and concluding “that gay persons are entitled to marry the otherwise
qualified same sex partner of their choice”); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 907 (Iowa
2009) (striking statutory language “limiting civil marriage to a man and a woman” and
allowing gay and lesbian persons to marry); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941, 969 (Mass. 2003) (construing civil marriage as a “voluntary union of two
persons as spouses” and expressly allowing same-sex couples access to “the protections,
benefits, and obligations of civil marriage”); Abby Goodnough, New Hampshire Approves
Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A19 (reporting Governor Lynch’s
signing of New Hampshire’s same-sex marriage bill); Abby Goodnough, Rejecting Veto,
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With the exception of a provision excluding unconsummated
proxy marriages,5 the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
does not define the words “marriage” and “spouse.” 6 In 1982, however,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Adams v. Howerton that
the terms referred only to heterosexual marriage.7 The 1996 Defense
of Marriage Act (DOMA) clarified the issue by defining “marriage”
for all federal purposes as “a legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife.” 8 DOMA closed the door to same-sex
marriage recognition under the INA for now,9 but DOMA may be
repealed or struck down.
Legislation to repeal DOMA was introduced with ninety-two
original co-sponsors in the House of Representatives in September,
Vermont Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at A1 (reporting that Vermont’s
legislature overrode Governor Jim Douglas’s veto of that state’s same-sex marriage bill);
see also National Conference of State Legislatures, Same Sex Marriage, Civil Unions and
Domestic Partnerships (Jan. 2010), http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/HumanServices/
SameSexMarriage/tabid/16430/Default.aspx [hereinafter NCSL Marriage Report] (provid-
ing a history and list of facts about same-sex marriage in the United States).
Marriage licenses were issued to same-sex couples in California following a state
supreme court decision requiring that “the designation of marriage [must be] available
both to opposite-sex and same-sex couples.” In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 453 (Cal.
2008). Following the passage of a statewide referendum rejecting same-sex marriage in
November, 2008, new licenses are no longer issued in California; however, that state does
still recognize the marriages of approximately 18,000 couples who were married during
the seven months when marriage licenses were issued. Maura Dolan, Battles Brew as
Gay Marriage Ban is Upheld, L.A. TIMES, May 27, 2009, at A1. As of March 3, 2010, the
District of Columbia also recognizes same-sex marriages. Keith L. Alexander & Ann. E.
Marimow, For Gays, a D.C. Day to Treasure: Joyful Couples Turn out as City Begins
Licensing Same-Sex Couples, WASH. POST, Mar. 4, 2010, at A1. In addition to the states
that have issued marriage licenses to same-sex couples, Rhode Island, New York, and
Maryland have expressly recognized same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere. NCSL
Marriage Report, supra; Aaron C. Davis & John Wagner, Maryland to Recognize Gay
Marriages from other Places, WASH. POST, Feb. 25, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost
.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/24/AR2010022405686.html.
On May 6, 2009, Governor John Baldacci of Maine signed into law legislation that
would recognize same-sex marriage. Abby Goodnough, Maine Governor Signs Same-Sex
Marriage Bill as Opponents Plan a ‘Veto,’ N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2009, at A21. Opponents
of the marriage bill, however, obtained enough signatures to suspend its implementation
until a public referendum successfully blocked implementation of the legislation on
November 3, 2009. Associated Press, Voters in Maine Will Decide Fate of Same-Sex
Marriage Law, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2009, at A16; Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Rebuke
May Result in a Change in Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A25.
5. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2006).
6. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101.
7. 673 F.2d 1036, 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1982).
8. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, §§ 1-3, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
9. Courts have found that “[t]he language of DOMA is clear and unambiguous. It
states that, in all acts of Congress, the term ‘marriage’ means only the legal union between
one man and one woman, and the word ‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite
sex that is a husband or wife.” In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 134 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004).
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2009.10 President Obama and his administration have declared a de-
sire to repeal DOMA.11 President Clinton, who supported and signed
DOMA into law in 1996, now apparently favors federal recognition of
state same-sex marriages.12 The American Bar Association (ABA) re-
cently called on Congress to repeal the federal definition of “marriage”
in DOMA.13 Even former U.S. Congressman Bob Barr, the original
sponsor of DOMA in the U.S. House of Representatives, has changed
10. Respect for Marriage Act of 2009, H.R. 3567, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009). If
enacted in its present form, the Respect for Marriage Act of 2009 would greatly simplify
the analysis described in this article with regard to most categories of marriage, including
same-sex marriage. It would require federal recognition of any marriage valid in the
state or country where celebrated as long as that marriage “could have been entered into
in a State” (i.e., as long as at least one U.S. state recognizes the category of marriage).
This would largely eliminate federal consideration of categorical public policy exceptions
to marriage in a couple’s state of domicile. The bill would not, however, require recog-
nition of polygamy or other marital forms that are recognized by no U.S. state. Nor would
it eliminate specific, express federal public policy exceptions to the recognition of sham
marriages or unconsummated proxy marriages in the immigration context. Id. Of course,
there is no guarantee that the Respect for Marriage Act will be enacted in its present
form, if it is enacted at all.
11. See, e.g., Ethan Jacobs, Obama Administration Mum on DOMA Challenge, BAY
WINDOWS, Mar. 5, 2009, at 1 (quoting an Obama administration official on the President’s
support for repeal of DOMA); Chris Johnson, White House Affirms Support for DOMA
Repeal: Obama Wants Marriage Issue ‘Left to the States,’ WASH. BLADE, May 22, 2009,
http://www.washblade.com/thelatest/thelatest.cfm?blog_id=24630, reprinted in OUT WORDS,
June 2009, at 3 (quoting a statement by the Obama administration regarding its support
for the repeal of DOMA). Faced with political pressure from lesbian, gay, bisexual and
transgender (LGBT) activists due to its defense of the constitutionality of DOMA, the
Obama Justice Department even took the unusual step of expressly explaining in a brief
defending DOMA’s constitutionality that “this Administration does not support DOMA
as a matter of policy, believes that it is discriminatory, and supports its repeal.” Reply
Memorandum in Support of Defendant United States of America’s Motion to Dismiss at
2, Smelt v. United States, No. 8:09-cv-00286-DOC-MLG (C.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2009).
President Obama’s position on the repeal of DOMA is clearly a mainstream view within
the Democratic Party. All of his major rivals in the 2008 Democratic presidential primary
also supported a repeal of at least the federal definition section of DOMA. Kevin Naff,
Editorial, Hillary for President, WASH. BLADE, Dec. 21, 2007, at 18 (describing Clinton’s
position in favor of repealing the federal definition section of DOMA as well as positions
in favor of repealing DOMA in its entirety by presidential candidates John Edwards, Bill
Richardson, and Barack Obama).
12. Michael Tracey, Bill Clinton Backs Same-Sex Marriage, THE NATION, July 14,
2009, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090720/tracey (describing President Clinton’s
“evolving” support of same-sex marriage in general and his opposition to viewing mar-
riage as a “federal question,” presumably including the federal definition of “marriage”
in DOMA); see also Press Release, Rep. Jerrold Nadler, The Respect for Marriage Act
Garners Support of President Clinton and Former Rep. Bob Barr, DOMA’s Original
Author (Sept. 15, 2009), http://www.house.gov/apps/list/press/ny08_nadler/DOMA2009
0915.html [hereinafter Press Release, Nadler] (quoting former President Clinton and
former Representative Bob Barr on their support for the Respect for Marriage Act).
13. Edward Adams, Gay Marriage Measure Passes House Without Debate (ABA
Chicago), A.B.A. J., Aug. 3, 2009, http://www.abajournal.com/news/gay_marriage_measure
_passes_house_without_debate_abachicago/.
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his mind and called for its repeal.14 With so much political movement
on the issue, the possibility of Congressional repeal of DOMA is now
possible for the first time since its enactment in 1996.
In addition to potential legislative action, there are several prom-
inent lawsuits currently making their way through the federal court
system, any one of which could lead a court to strike down the federal
definition of “marriage” in DOMA as unconstitutional.15 A number 
14. Bob Barr, Op-Ed., Wedding Blues, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2009, at A13 (explaining his
change of mind on the basis of his improved understanding of DOMA’s negative relation-
ship to his concept of federalism); see also Press Release, Nadler, supra note 12 (quoting
Bob Barr’s support for the Respect for Marriage Act of 2009).
15. Gill v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., No. 1:09-CV-10309 (D. Mass. filed July 31, 2009);
Commonwealth v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., No. 1:09-CV-11156 (D. Mass.
filed July 8, 2009); see also Glad.org, Commonwealth Files Suit Challenging DOMA
Sec 3 (July 8, 2009), http://www.glad.org/current/news-detail/commonwealth-files-suit
-challengine-doma-sec-3/ (reporting on the suit brought by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts); Glad.org, Gill et al. v. Office of Personnel Management et al., http://
www.glad.org/work/cases/gill-vs-office-of-personnel-management/ (last visited Jan. 23,
2010) (describing the legal challenges brought by Gay and Lesbian Advocates and
Defenders (GLAD)).
Neither of these cases challenges DOMA’s federal definition in the specific context of
federal immigration law. Perhaps this is because of the well-recognized doctrine that
Congress has near-plenary powers to regulate in the area of immigration, including the
recognition or refusal to recognize sham marriages. Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 797-99
(1977) (applying a highly deferential standard to congressional decisions regarding immi-
gration policy to find no constitutional violation in a law discriminating in the definition
of “child” for immigration purposes between the natural children of U.S. citizen mothers
and U.S. citizen fathers); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972) (“The Court
without exception has sustained Congress’ plenary power to make rules for the admission
of aliens and to exclude those who possess those characteristics which Congress has
forbidden.”(quotation marks and citations omitted)); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531
(1954) (“[T]hat the formulation of these [immigration procedural] policies is entrusted
exclusively to Congress has become about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and
judicial tissues of our body politic as any aspect of our government.”); Lutwak v. United
States, 344 U.S. 604, 611 (1954) (upholding decision of immigration authorities to deny
entry based on marriage when the otherwise valid marriage was not entered into in good
faith); Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 210 (1953) (stating that immigration is a polit-
ical power “largely immune from judicial control”); Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan,
214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909) (“[O]ver no conceivable subject is the legislative power of Congress
more complete than it is over” the admission of aliens.); Chae Chan Ping v. United States
(The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581, 603 (1889) (upholding the Chinese Exclusion
Act as applied to former U.S. residents based on the broad federal power to admit or ex-
clude foreign nationals as “an incident of every independent nation”). This doctrine has
been so widely recognized that the Merriam-Webster Dictionary uses the following sentence
as its example for the use of the word “plenary,” meaning “complete in every respect”: “The
U.S. Congress has plenary power to pass laws regulating immigration and naturalization.”
Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary (May 21, 2009), http://www.merriam-webster.com/
cgi-bin/mwwodarch.pl?May.21.2009.
Courts apply this highly deferential standard even where immigration benefits are
denied on grounds that would be constitutionally suspect, triggering heightened scrutiny,
or otherwise impermissible in another context. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976);
see also Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 445 (1998) (finding Congress can impose
immigration restrictions based on gender); Kleindienst, 408 U.S. at 769-70 (holding that
courts will not question the discretion of Congress in immigration nor balance it against
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of prominent legal scholars agree that the law is unconstitutional.16
the First Amendment); Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118-19 (1967) (affirming the Court
of Appeals finding that Congress intended to prevent homosexuals from entering the
United States); Nazareno v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 512 F.2d 936, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (finding
that the Board of Immigration Appeals’ interpretation of a statute allowed it to exclude
based on age); Dunn v. INS, 499 F.2d 856, 858 (9th Cir. 1974) (finding Congress has the
power to exclude foreigners based on race); Faustino v. INS, 432 F.2d 429, 431 (2d Cir.
1970) (finding Congress may exclude based on national origin); United States v. Esperdy,
277 F.2d 537, 539 (2d Cir. 1960) (finding Congress may exclude based on medical con-
dition); Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 165 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (finding Congress’s plenary
power in immigration has few limits, even if constitutionally suspect in other situations).
Even under this highly deferential standard, however, there are some limitations on con-
gressional and executive power in the area of immigration. See The Chinese Exclusion
Case, 130 U.S. at 604 (explaining that the sovereign power of the federal government to
control immigration is restricted by the Constitution and “considerations of public policy
and justice which control, more or less, the conduct of all civilized nations”); see also
Matthew S. Pinix, The Unconstitutionality of DOMA + INA: How Immigration Law
Provides a Forum for Attacking DOMA, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 455, 457-58
(2008) (arguing that DOMA is particularly vulnerable to a constitutional attack in the
immigration context). Some scholars have argued that the plenary powers doctrine may
be in a state of decline. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century
of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE
L.J. 545, 549-50 (1990) (describing “the gradual demise of the plenary power doctrine . . .
as a function of the tension in immigration cases between constitutional doctrine and
statutory interpretation”); Peter Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power, 16 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339 (2002) (focusing on two 2001 cases that could signal a retreat from
the doctrine). But see T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Detaining Plenary Power: The Meaning
and Impact of Zadvydas v. Davis, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 365, 366 (2002) (suggesting that
Zadvydas did not “represent the death knell for the plenary power doctrine”).
Perhaps the choice not to include immigration plaintiffs in these challenges to DOMA
is a well-advised litigation strategy, given the complicated arguments that would otherwise
ensue. However, it is not obvious that this plenary power doctrine of extreme deference
to Congress’s powers to regulate U.S. immigration applies to a general definition, like
DOMA, which was not specifically aimed at immigration policy.
Powerful and talented lawyers and legislators are currently pursuing two other strat-
egies that would achieve the recognition of same-sex relationships under U.S. immigration
law. First, Bush administration Solicitor General Theodore Olson and David Boies, his
adversary in Bush v. Gore, together filed Perry v. Schwarzenegger, arguing that marriage
discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Complaint at 8-9, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-2292 (N.D. Cal.
2009). If the U.S. Supreme Court should eventually agree with them on that point, then
every state would have to recognize same-sex marriage. Second, the Judiciary Committee
in the U.S. Senate recently held hearings regarding the Uniting American Families Act
(UAFA), which would specifically recognize qualifying same-sex permanent partners for
immigration purposes, regardless of their marital status. The Uniting Families Act:
Addressing Inequality in Federal Immigration Law Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
111th Cong. (2009). UAFA and the repeal of DOMA would each result in the recognition
of many same-sex couples under U.S. immigration laws. However, they would not help
all of the same couples. UAFA would recognize some couples who could not marry in their
jurisdictions, but it would not recognize some recently married couples or fiancées who
would qualify under the INA if DOMA is repealed. See infra Part VI.A (discussing the
limitations of UAFA).
16. See, e.g., Stanley E. Cox, DOMA and Conflicts Law: Congressional Rules and
Domestic Relations Conflicts Law, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1063, 1075-76 (1999) (arguing
that DOMA is unconstitutional because it improperly substitutes substantive federal
rules for state sovereign legislative power); Larry Kramer, Same-Sex Marriage, Conflict
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While courts have not yet responded favorably to suits challenging
DOMA,17 at least one federal appellate court judge has already found
that the federal definition of “marriage” in DOMA is unconstitutional
in the context of denying health insurance coverage to the legal same-
sex spouses of federal employees.18
Of course, there is no certainty regarding when, or if, DOMA will
be repealed or struck down. One goal of this article is to explain the
landscape that will exist if it is. Even without DOMA, some legal
same-sex marriages may not be recognized under U.S. immigration
law. Fortunately, there is a wealth of guidance about how our immi-
gration system deals with marriages that are recognized in some, but
not all, states. That guidance would likely apply to same-sex marriage
in a world without DOMA.
The other primary goal of this article is to illuminate the analysis
that federal courts, U.S. Attorneys General, the Board of Immigration
Appeals (BIA or Board) and immigration officials have consistently
applied to determine the validity of marriages under the INA. This
article distills and describes the consistent analytical framework rec-
ognized piecemeal in the dozens of cases involving marriages of uncles
and nieces, spouses of different races, transgender spouses and other
disputed marriages. This three-step analysis should assist practitioners
and scholars to understand the system currently defining the legal
validity under the INA of marriages not recognized in all U.S. states.
of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L.J. 1965, 1966-67
(1997) (arguing that both the public policy exception and DOMA are incompatible with
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Constitution); Emma Ruby-Sachs,
Obama’s Law Professor Says DOMA Unconstitutional, HUFFINGTON POST, June 5, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emma-rubysachs/obamas-law-professor=says_b_211854
.html (quoting leading constitutional scholar and Harvard Law Professor Laurence Tribe’s
comment that “Section 3 of DOMA is unconstitutional, at least as applied to couples like
those who are currently challenging it in federal court . . . in Massachusetts. . . . I think
the equality component of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbids the federal
government to deny same-sex spouses benefits identical to those it would grant to
opposite-sex spouses when the spouses are ‘married’ under the law of their state.”). But
see Lynn D. Wardle, Revisiting DOMA, OR. ST. B. BULL. 21, 23-25 (June 1998) (arguing
that DOMA actually preserves federalism and is constitutional).
17. See Smelt v. County of Orange, 447 F.3d 673, 686 (9th Cir. 2006) (finding plain-
tiffs had no standing to challenge DOMA); Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04
(M.D. Fla. 2005) (upholding DOMA as constitutional in a challenge to the interstate
recognition component found in Section 2); In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 148 (Bankr. W.D.
Wash. 2004) (upholding DOMA’s constitutionality in the context of a bankruptcy case).
18. In In re Levenson, Judge Reinhardt found DOMA unconstitutional under Fifth
Amendment equal protection as applied to deny federal benefits to the same-sex spouse
of a federal public defender. 560 F.3d 1145, 1151 (9th Cir. 2009). In another instance, in
In re Golinski, Chief Judge Kozinski ordered that benefits be allowed to the same-sex
spouse of a staff attorney with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but he did so on the
basis of perceived ambiguity of the term “family” in the federal employee benefits law.
587 F.3d 901, 902-04 (9th Cir. 2009).
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Part I of this article briefly explains the pervasive significance
of the terms “marriage” and “spouse” throughout all areas of U.S.
immigration law. Part II systematically maps out a three-step test
embodying the rules that have been consistently applied to determine
the validity of marriages for immigration purposes. Part III demon-
strates in detail the precedents applying the various components of
this analytical framework to specific categories of marriage that are,
or were, not universally recognized, including biracial marriage, mar-
riage between close relatives, marriage involving minors, marriage
involving transgender spouses, proxy marriage, polygamy, and same-
sex marriage. Part IV evaluates Adams v. Howerton, the sole federal
appellate case addressing the validity of same-sex marriage under
the INA before the enactment of DOMA.19 While Adams’s holding
seems sound, the court’s reasoning is, in part, misguided, and, in part,
well-founded but legislatively superseded. In anticipation of a world
without DOMA, Part V applies the analytical framework set out in
Parts II and III in the context of same-sex marriage cases, to iden-
tify which same-sex marriages would be recognized if DOMA were re-
pealed or struck down. Finally, Part VI briefly describes other current
strategies that could result in recognition of same-sex relationships
under the INA, including a pending federal constitutional challenge
to marriage discrimination in California and the Uniting American
Families Act (UAFA); it then identifies the different potential results
of each strategy.
I. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF “MARRIAGE” UNDER THE INA
Family unity, particularly among spouses and their minor
children, is the primary concern of U.S. immigration law today.20 As
INS Commissioner Doris Meissner testified in 1995, “[f]amily reuni-
fication has been the centerpiece of our legal immigration system for
decades, and it should remain so.” 21
Under current law, most U.S. immigrants are allowed to immi-
grate on the basis of family unity. The primary category of immigrant
visa not subject to a specific numerical quota is that of “spouses” and
19. IMMIGRATION EQUAL. & TRANSGENDER LAW CTR., IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE
TRANSGENDER CLIENT § 4.1.1 (2008), http://www.immigrationequality.org/template3.php
?pageid=1135.
20. See Reform of Legal Immigration: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 13 (1995) (INS Commissioner Doris
Meissner’s testimony expressing the strong support of the Clinton Administration and
the nonpartisan Jordan Commission for keeping “the reunification of U.S. citizens with
their spouses and minor children as legal immigration’s top priority”).
21. Id.
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other “immediate relatives” of U.S. citizens.22 In addition, the vast
majority of those subject to immigrant visa quotas also base their
claims to immigrate on their recognized familial relationships.
The annual quota for the “immediate relatives” of lawful perma-
nent residents (“green card” holders) ranges from 226,000 to 480,000
people.23 This far exceeds the combined total of 140,000 immigrants
allowed in the employment-based visa category24 and 55,000 gener-
ally reserved under the nationality-based “diversity visa lottery”
category.25 Furthermore, spouses and children are allowed to immi-
grate as “derivatives” of the primary beneficiaries of employment and
diversity based petitions, and these derivative family members are
counted against the employment and diversity visa quotas.26 There-
fore, it is likely that the majority of immigrants in even the employ-
ment and diversity visa categories actually qualify because they
are the “spouses” or children of someone else.
The recognition of a foreign national’s “marriage” under U.S.
immigration law is essential to everything from eligibility for a
family-based nonimmigrant or immigrant visa;27 to eligibility as
the dependent of another foreign national who is a visa holder,28
22. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2) (2006). Other
than spouses, the term “immediate relative” encompasses children and parents, if their
U.S. citizen child is at least twenty-one years old. Id.
23. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(c).
24. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(d). Although this 140,000
visa limitation could theoretically be increased by unused family-based visa quota
numbers, that is not likely to happen.
25. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(e). This number is
currently reduced by the amount of visas allotted to immigrants under the NACARA
program. IRA J. KURZBAN, IMMIGRATION LAW SOURCEBOOK 660 (10th ed. 2006).
26. Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(f)(4), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(4).
27. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)
(A)(i) (family-sponsored spouses and other immediate relatives admissible to the United
States without regard to per country quotas); Immigration and Nationality Act § 202(a)(4),
8 U.S.C. § 1152(a)(4) (special rules setting aside seventy-five percent of second preference
immigrant visas for the spouses and children of lawful permanent residents from the per
country limit); Immigration and Nationality Act § 202(b)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1152(b)(2) (allowing
applicants for lawful permanent residence to “cross-charge” and be counted against the
less subscribed quota of a spouse’s country of nativity); Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 203(a)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1153(a)(2) (setting aside seventy-seven percent of second preference
immigrant visas for the spouses and children of lawful permanent residents); Immigration
and Nationality Act § 216, 8 U.S.C. § 1186a (prescribing procedures for conditional per-
manent residence for couples married for less than twenty-four months as well as the
later removal of that conditionality).
28. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(E)
(providing for nonimmigrant visa status for the spouses of nonimmigrant investors and
Australians performing specialty occupations in the United States); Immigration and
Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(F)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(F)(ii) (providing for the spouses
of student visa holders); Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(H), 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H) (providing for the spouses of H visa holders); Immigration and Nationality
Act § 101(a)(15)(J), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(J) (providing for nonimmigrant visa status for
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immigrant,29 or refugee;30 to exceptions to, or eligibility for, waivers of
deportability, inadmissibility, or benefit ineligibility.31 For instance,
the spouses of practical trainees and other J visa holders); Immigration and Nationality
Act § 101(a)(15)(L), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(L) (providing for the spouses of intra-company
transferees); Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(R), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(R)
(providing for nonimmigrant visa status for the spouses of religious workers).
29. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 203, 8 U.S.C. § 1153 (providing for
the spouses and children of applicants for lawful permanent residence on the basis of
extraordinary ability; employment as an outstanding researcher or professor, multinational
manager or executive, advanced degree professional, alien of exceptional ability, profes-
sional, skilled worker, or other worker; or a million dollar U.S. investment); Immigration
and Nationality Act § 216A, 8 U.S.C. § 1186b (prescribing procedures for two-year condi-
tional permanent residence for the spouses of immigrant investors as well as the later
removal of that conditionality).
30. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 207(c)(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1157(c)(2) (provid-
ing for the admission of the spouse of a recognized refugee); Immigration and Nationality
Act § 208(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3) (providing derivative status for the spouse of a
foreign national granted asylum in the United States); Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 209(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(3) (providing for lawful permanent residence adjustment
of status for the spouses of individuals granted asylum in the United States).
31. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(3)(D)(iv), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)
(D)(iv) (providing a waiver to inadmissibility based on membership in a totalitarian party
to the spouse of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident); Immigration and Nationality
Act § 212(a)(4)(C)(i)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4)(C)(i)(i) (providing an exception to general in-
admissibility as a likely public charge for the spouse of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident); Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(6)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(E)(ii)
(providing an exception to inadmissibility based on alien smuggling in certain cir-
cumstances where an alien “aided only the alien’s spouse, parent, son, or daughter”);
Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(v) (providing
a waiver to inadmissibility due to unlawful presence in the United States to prevent
extreme hardship to the U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse of the foreign
national); Immigration and Nationality Act §§ 212(d)(11)-(12), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(d)(11)-(12)
(providing for waivers to inadmissibility “for humanitarian purposes or to assure family
unity,” specifically referring to assistance to a spouse); Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 212(g)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(g)(1)(A) (providing a waiver to inadmissibility of a foreign
national on health related grounds for the spouse of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident); Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(h)(1)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h)(1)(B) (pro-
viding a waiver to crime-based inadmissibility that would result in “extreme hardship”
to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident spouse); Immigration and Nationality Act
§ 212(i)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(i)(1) (providing a waiver to inadmissibility based on misrepre-
sentation where it would result in “extreme hardship” to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent
resident spouse); Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)
(E)(ii) (providing a special rule in favor of those eligible immigrants guilty of alien smug-
gling if they only assisted their own spouses, parents, sons or daughters); Immigration
and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(E)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(E)(iii) (allowing a discre-
tionary waiver for those guilty of alien smuggling if they only assisted their own spouses
or other immediate relatives); Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(H)(i)(i), 8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(H)(i)(i) (providing for a waiver to inadmissibility based on fraud or other
material misrepresentations for the spouses of U.S. citizens and lawful permanent
residents); Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(2)(C)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C)(ii)
(providing for a waiver of deportability for document fraud where the fraud was solely per-
petrated for the benefit of a spouse or child); Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b)
(1)(D), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (providing for cancellation of removal and adjustment
of status in spite of inadmissibility of deportability if the foreign national has been in the
United States for at least ten years, has fulfilled other preconditions, and has a U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident spouse, parent or child who will suffer “extremely unusual
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most immigrants illegally in the United States are barred from other
immigration options (e.g., employment-based petitions) even if they
would otherwise qualify.32 For these millions of foreign nationals,
marriage-based petitions are the only hope to legalize their status in
the United States.
In summation, the recognition of a marriage frequently deter-
mines whether a foreign national may obtain a visa, enter the United
States, legalize unlawful status, remain in the United States tempo-
rarily or permanently, become a U.S. citizen, or even be deported. The
definition of marriage under the INA is critical in all of these cases.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING THE VALIDITY OF A MARRIAGE
UNDER THE INA
U.S. immigration cases involving marriage validity have been
decided in a piecemeal, case-specific manner. A systematic review
of the case law, however, reveals consistent standards that can be
distilled and described as a three-step test.
Over the last century, these standards for analyzing the validity
of purported “marriages” under U.S. immigration law have been re-
markably stable. They have changed little from Devine v. Rodgers33
in 1901 to U.S. Attorney General Mitchell’s 1933 Opinion regarding
uncle-niece marriage34 to the 2005 BIA case, In re Lovo-Lara, recog-
nizing a transgender spouse’s marriage.35
hardship” if the relative is removed); Immigration and Nationality Act § 240A(b)(2), 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(2) (providing for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for
foreign nationals who have “been battered or subjected to extreme cruelty by” U.S. citizen
or lawful permanent resident spouses); Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(e)(3), 8
U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3) (providing an exception to the general prohibition of spousal immigrant
visa status to a foreign national who married while awaiting removal or admission in
administrative or judicial proceedings in cases where the marriage is proven legitimate);
Immigration and Nationality Act § 316(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(b) (providing an exception to
some naturalization residence prerequisites where the applicant’s spouse has been work-
ing abroad for the U.S. government or abroad in certain other occupations in the U.S.
national interest).
32. Immigration and Nationality Act § 212(a)(9)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) (bar-
ring most foreign nationals who have been unlawfully present in the United States for
one year or more from admission or most other immigration benefits until ten years after
their departure from the United States).
33. 109 F. 886, 887-88 (E.D. Pa. 1901) (refusing to recognize a Russian marriage for
immigration purposes after analyzing the validity of that marriage under the law where
it was celebrated and the exception to the rule of recognition based on the public policy
of Pennsylvania, which punished such uncle-niece marriages under state criminal law).
34. 37 Op. Att’y. Gen. 102, 102, 109-11 (1933) [hereinafter 1933 Attorney General
Opinion] (looking to the law of Poland, where the relationship was celebrated, to establish
a presumption of validity, finding that Congress had deferred to the traditional state role
in regulating marriage, so there was no applicable federal definition, and then examin-
ing whether a strongly held public policy was expressed in state law criminalizing the
relationship or evasion of state marriage laws).
35. 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 751 (B.I.A. 2005) (reiterating the essential importance of the
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A. Three Steps to Marriage Recognition Under the INA
In practice, the analysis of marriage validity under the INA can
best be understood as a three-step test:
1. Validity where celebrated: Immigration officials and federal
courts first insist that a marriage meets the procedural and substan-
tive requirements of the state or country where the marriage was
“celebrated,” whether those requirements involve state licensing, reli-
gious recognition or even no “celebration” at all in the case of “common
law” marriage.36 The widely recognized general rule is that a marriage
will be recognized everywhere if it is valid where “celebrated.” 37
2. Categorical public policy exceptions: The rare categorical
exceptions to the general federal public policy in favor of universal
recognition are based on strongly held specific public policy objections
regarding who may marry whom, either in the couple’s state of domi-
cile, or intended domicile, or under federal immigration law.38
3. Bona fides: Finally, even if a marriage is legally valid where
celebrated and there is no strong public policy exception to recognition
of that category of relationship, U.S. immigration officials look at the
particular facts of a couple’s life together to determine whether their
individual marriage is bona fide for immigration purposes.39 This
bona fides test is a practical concession to the fact that U.S. immi-
gration benefits are so desirable that some people are willing to enter
into “fraudulent” marriages merely for the purpose of obtaining those
immigration benefits.40 While legally valid for other purposes, these
marriages are not valid under the INA.41
Foreign nationals and U.S. citizens have consistently satisfied all
three steps before their relationships are recognized as “marriages”
under U.S. immigration law.42 Courts and the BIA have, however,
validity of a marriage in the jurisdiction where it was celebrated, the federal recognition
of marriage as “almost exclusively a State matter”).
36. See infra Part III.A (discussing the rule that marriages valid where celebrated
are valid everywhere).
37. See infra Part III.A (discussing the rule that marriages valid where celebrated
are valid everywhere).
38. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing state and federal public policy exceptions to the
general rule of marriage validity).
39. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing “marriage fraud”).
40. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing “marriage fraud”).
41. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing “marriage fraud”).
42. See Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 879 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002) (listing three similar
but not identical requirements of “legal validity,” “bona fides,” and “public policy”). But
see Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982) (describing the test for
“marriage validity” as a two-step test: (1) validity under state law and (2) validity under
federal immigration law). While technically correct, the Adams test is an incomplete and
misleading way to conceptualize this issue. Unlike the analysis long applied by the BIA
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addressed these issues in an unsystematic, piecemeal fashion. Step
one provides a strong general presumption in favor of universal rec-
ognition of marriages that are valid where celebrated. Therefore, the
BIA and courts tend to discuss the other factors only when one has
been raised to justify an exception to this rule of recognition.
While not identical, the analysis underlying steps one and two
generally parallels the analysis of marital portability under conflict
of law rules, including comity43 and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of the U.S. Constitution.44 Step three is a new and specific test based
and other courts, it fails to recognize the significance of marriage validity where celebrated
(whether a foreign jurisdiction or U.S. state). It blurs the distinction between states as
the place of marital celebration and as the location of a couple’s current domicile, and it
places undue focus on the rare instances where a strong federal public policy exception
has been expressed, inviting courts to create a new federal definition of “marriage” where
none was intended. See infra Part IV (criticizing and reevaluating the reasoning in Adams).
43. “Comity” is “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to inter-
national duty and convenience.” Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895). Unlike the
constitutional requirement of interstate “full faith and credit,” state courts are at liberty
to recognize, or fail to recognize, comity within their own jurisdictions as they see fit, and
without federal judicial interference. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185, 190
(1912); see also In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 133 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (refusing comity
to a same-sex couple married in British Columbia).
44. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 provides that “Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.” Supreme
Court decisions have, however, clarified that there is an exception to full faith and credit
for acts, such as marriage, when a state has a strongly held public policy objection to its
recognition. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 422 (1979) (citing Pac. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident
Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939)); see also Wilson v. Ake, 354 F. Supp. 2d 1298, 1303-04 (M.D.
Fla. 2005) (finding that a Massachusetts same-sex marriage “clearly conflicts with Florida’s
legitimate public policy of opposing same-sex marriage” based inter alia on its state mini-
DOMA statute). On the other hand, there is “no roving ‘public policy exception’ ” to final
judgments of courts of law, such as divorces. Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp. 522 U.S. 222, 223
(1998); see also Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216, 227-28 (1934) (noting that in spite
of a public policy exception to the recognition of “rights acquired elsewhere,” once those
rights “have ripened into a judgment of a court in another State, the full faith and credit
clause applies”). Article IV requires recognition that a sister state’s “decree of divorce is
a conclusive adjudication of everything except” jurisdiction. Williams v. North Carolina,
325 U.S. 226, 232 (1945). Even the issue of jurisdiction is precluded from collateral attack
where it was decided in adherence with due process and with both parties present. Sherrer
v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 349, 351-52 (1948) (distinguishing Williams).
DOMA actually purports to be acting on Congress’s authority by prescribing the effect
of state acts, records and proceedings under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV,
§ 1 of the U.S. Constitution. Unlike other statutes implementing the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, DOMA expressly permits states to refuse recognition to the acts, records and
judicial proceedings of other states to the extent they recognize same-sex marriage. Cf.
28 U.S.C. § 1738A (2006) (requiring interstate full faith and credit for final child custody
or visitation determinations); 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (regulating the interstate recognition and
modification of child support orders). This procedural preference for state substantive
policy with which Congress agrees has been attacked as an inappropriate or unconsti-
tutional exercise of legislative authority. Cox, supra note 16, at 1063. Of course, in light
of the Supreme Court’s construction of a “public policy exception” to acts under the Full
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on particular concerns arising in the immigration context.45 In fact,
there are strong arguments that state and federal authorities could
not employ this intrusive examination of marital bona fides in con-
texts other than immigration, where Congress’s broad authority is
arguably at its apex.46
A “sham marriage” that fails case-specific review of its bona
fides under step three could be viewed as one category of federal
public policy exception described under step two. Instead, courts
have generally described sham marriages as a matter of definition:
when Congress used the words “marriage” and “spouse” in the INA,
Congress intended these words to mean marriages that were not
entered solely for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.47
And, in specifying the necessary proof of marriage legitimacy for
conditional lawful permanent residence status, Congress expressly
categorized the question of marriage fraud separately from other
considerations regarding marriage validity, such as validity in the
place of celebration and divorce.48
Whatever its theoretical underpinnings, the intrusive, case-
specific factual examination of marital bona fides is such a departure
from the government’s role in recognizing marriage in other contexts
and such a major focus of immigration practice that it deserves to be
classified separately. In practice, one would not consider the bona
fides of a specific marriage unless that marriage fits into a category
that passes muster under both steps one and two. For instance, an
immigration examiner would not delve into the bona fides of a
polygamous marriage, since it is categorically excluded under step
two above.
Faith and Credit Clause, the only likely conflict between Article II of DOMA and the Full
Faith and Credit Clause would be in the area of final judgments of courts of competent
jurisdiction such as divorce decrees.
45. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing the issue of “marriage fraud” in immigration).
46. For discussion of plenary powers in the immigration context, see supra note 15.
47. See United States v. Diogo, 320 F.2d 898, 905 (2d Cir. 1963) (“Of course Congress
may adopt a federal standard of bona fides for the limited purpose of denying immi-
gration priorities to persons whose marriages do not meet that standard. That standard
[is] embodied in the Congressional understanding of the terms ‘marriage’ or ‘spouse’ as
those terms appear in the immigration statutes . . . .”). Excluding “sham marriages,” only
three federal exceptions to the rule of recognition have been found: unconsummated
proxy marriages, polygamy and same sex marriage. For further discussion of these
exceptions, see infra Part III.C. Like “sham marriages,” all of these federal exceptions
could be viewed as both strongly held public policy objections and federal definitional limits
on the word “marriage” in light of the direct or implied objections expressed in the text
of the INA. For purposes of describing and employing the three step process detailed in
this paper, I find it most useful to classify them with the other public policy exceptions
in step two.
48. Immigration and Nationality Act § 216(d)(1)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)
(2006).
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Although it first points out how these three steps work together,
this article focuses mainly on step two, delineating the contours of
those exceptional situations in which U.S. immigration law refuses
to recognize legally valid marriages due to strongly held public policy
objections. It is important to remember throughout this discussion,
however, that these situations are merely exceptions to the overriding
federal public policy favoring recognition of marriages that are valid
where celebrated.
B. The Rules for Assessing Whether Public Policy Warrants an
Exception to the General Rule Favoring Marriage Recognition
For well over a century, courts and immigration authorities have
recognized the general rule that marriages, valid in the country or
state where celebrated, are valid everywhere.49 In 1986, Congress codi-
fied that rule in the context of conditional marriage-based immigration
benefits in the INA.50 Neither the rule nor its recognized exceptions
have changed greatly since the term “marriage” was first introduced
in the INA. The exceptions depend either on the strongly held public
policy of the state of domicile or on express federal public policies,
such as the policies against polygamy and against unconsummated
proxy marriages.51
1. Strong Public Policy Exceptions of a Couple’s State of
Domicile
Even a marriage recognized as valid in the state or foreign
country where it was celebrated may not be valid for immigration
purposes if the couple’s state of domicile, or intended domicile, has
expressed a strong public policy objecting to the type of marriage in
question.52 This exception echoes conflict of law rules, especially the
49. Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. 550, 587 (1848); Devine v. Rodgers, 109 F. 886, 887
(E.D. Pa. 1901); In re Rodriguez-Cruz, 18 I. & N. Dec. 72, 73 (B.I.A. 1981); In re Freeman,
11 I. & N. Dec. 482, 483 (B.I.A. 1966); In re P---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 610, 613 (A.G. 1952; B.I.A.
1952). This rule also applies to divorce. Jahed v. Acri, 468 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006);
In re Luna, 18 I. & N. Dec. 385, 386 (B.I.A. 1983).
50. Immigration and Nationality Act § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(i).
51. See infra Part III.B-C (discussing state and federal public policy exceptions to
marriage validity).
52. See infra Part III.B (discussing state public policy exceptions). This has been a
particular focus in the context of spouses who evade marriage requirements in their state
of domicile by traveling to another state or country for the sole purpose of avoiding the
state law. See, e.g., In re Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. 439, 439-40 (B.I.A. 1967) (refusing to
recognize the marriage of second cousins in South Carolina, since the couple’s trip to
South Carolina was solely for the purpose of evading Wisconsin’s criminal incest law);
In re M---, 3 I. & N. Dec. 465, 466 (B.I.A. 1948) (finding no intentional evasion of Illinois
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Supreme Court’s construction of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
of Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution.53 For instance, a policy
exception must generally be expressed in a written statute before it
will be recognized as an exception to the general rule of recognition.54
There are some major differences, however. For instance, the require-
ments for a sufficiently strong state policy objection appear to be
greater in the area of immigration law than under the Full Faith
and Credit Clause.55
The earliest immigration cases recognizing state public policy
objections to marriage, anti-miscegenation (biracial relationships)
and consanguinity (relationships between close relatives), demon-
strated a refusal to recognize marriages when the state of domicile
expressly and specifically criminalized cohabitation by the couple or
evasion of the state’s law to marry in another state and return to live
in that domicile.56 This is still the rule with regard to consanguinity.57
It is not enough that the state of domicile has clearly expressed its
refusal to recognize an uncle-niece marriage.58 If a state makes the
law); 1933 Attorney General Opinion, supra note 34, at 103-04 (focusing on a spouse’s
lack of intent to evade Virginia marriage law by marrying in Poland).
Outside the context of evasion, research reveals no reported BIA case refusing to
recognize a marriage validly celebrated in another state. Therefore, one might argue that
states are more deferential to marriages entered into in their sister states than those
celebrated in foreign countries. The BIA, however, has repeatedly stated its public policy
exception test in language that does not distinguish between foreign and domestic
marital jurisdictions, and it has applied that test in several cases, albeit without finding
a state public policy objection sufficient to reject another state’s marriage. See, e.g., In
re Hirabayashi, 10 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1964) (recognizing a Colorado marriage
between second cousins domiciled in Illinois since the marriage was not criminal in that
state); In re C---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 632, 637-38 (B.I.A. 1952) (recognizing a Rhode Island uncle-
niece marriage because there was no demonstration of a sufficiently strong Pennsylvania
public policy criminalizing the underlying relationship).
53. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text (discussing comity and the Full
Faith and Credit clause).
54. Part III, infra, demonstrates this implicit requirement of express statutory language
in the immigration context, with the exception of Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039
(9th Cir. 1982), and Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1414 (9th Cir. 1994). Outside of that con-
text, Justice Brandeis’s majority opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court in Loughran v.
Loughran explained that “[m]arriages, not polygamous or incestuous, or otherwise declared
void by statute, will, if valid by the law of the State where entered into, be recognized as
valid in every other jurisdiction.” 292 U.S. 216, 223 (1934) (citing Meister v. Moore, 96
U.S. 76, 78 (1877), and Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S. 423, 440 (1907)). Justice Brandeis
continued to explain, in the context of state prohibitions of remarriage after divorce, that
“[t]he mere statutory prohibition by the State of the domicile . . . is given only territorial
effect. Such a statute does not invalidate a marriage solemnized in another State in
conformity with the laws thereof.” Id. at 223.
55. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing consanguinity).
56. See infra Part III.B (discussing state public policy exceptions to marriage validity).
57. See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing consanguinity).
58. See infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text (stating that criminal liability has
generally been necessary to find a strong enough public policy exception to warrant
invalidation of a marriage that was valid where celebrated).
2010] THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 555
consanguineous relationship underlying that marriage a crime, it
demonstrates a sufficiently strong public policy, at least if the law
is enforced.59
Marriages to which a state of domicile objects on the basis of a
spouse’s age or gender reassignment have been recognized in all re-
ported BIA cases when they were valid in the state where celebrated.60
Age of consent cases raise a unique standard, distinguishing between
marriages that are void ab initio where celebrated and those merely
voidable if the minor spouse acts to negate it before reaching the age
of majority.61 Transgender cases focus on determining whether state
law views a marriage as one between opposite or same sex spouses,
i.e., whether DOMA applies.62
2. Federal Immigration Policy Exceptions to Marriage
Recognition
The BIA, immigration officials, and most federal courts agree
that Congress has the authority to define the terms “marriage” and
“spouse” for immigration purposes, and they have recognized excep-
tions to the general rule of marriage recognition in the very limited
areas where Congress has expressly demonstrated a relevant exclu-
sionary public policy. Absent a clear expression of legislative intent,
however, these authorities generally appear to view the primary
intent of Congress to be continued deference to the traditional state
authority to regulate marital status.
In two cases over a thirty year period, Adams v. Howerton63
and Kahn v. INS,64 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals appeared to
be searching for new federal definitions of “marriage” and “family,”
distinct from either state family law or express statutory language.
The BIA, other courts, and even some Ninth Circuit judges have not
been willing to assume that Congress was silently redefining the
terms “marriage” and “spouse” when it used them, without comment
in the INA. In spite of its sporadic quest for federally defined family
status, even the Ninth Circuit majority has failed to recognize a fed-
eral exception to the general rule of marriage recognition except in
59. See infra notes 154-155 and accompanying text (discussing criminal liability as
a basis for public policy exception to marriage validity).
60. See infra Part III.B.3-4 (discussing age-of-consent requirements and marriage
that involves a transgender spouse).
61. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing age-of-consent requirements as a public policy
exception).
62. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing marriage involving a transgender spouse as a
public policy exception).
63. 673 F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982).
64. 36 F.3d 1412 (9th Cir. 1994).
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cases that involved a relevant, express statutory expression of federal
public policy.
C. Federal Law Frequently Relies on State Law to Determine
Status Within State Purview
Immigration is not the only subject area that relies on state law
to determine status under federal law, particularly family status.
United States Supreme Court and courts of appeals opinions con-
structing other federal statutes have also relied on state law to de-
termine whether someone is “married” or not for purposes of federal
law, where that marriage is not specifically defined in the relevant
federal statute. For instance, in the context of federal copyright law,
the Supreme Court found that:
The scope of a federal right is, of course, a federal question, but
that does not mean that its content is not to be determined by
state, rather than federal law. This is especially true where a
statute deals with a familial relationship; there is no federal law of
domestic relations, which is primarily a matter of state concern.65
This federal reliance on state law concepts and status has been
widely recognized, especially in regard to matters of particular state
concern, such as family law.66 In fact, in a heated dissent in Kahn v.
65. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956) (citations omitted) (focusing on
state domestic law to determine whether a child was “legitimate” and, therefore, covered
by the term “children” under federal copyright law). De Sylva also implies that the federal
government might not properly rely on a state law that is “entirely strange to those
familiar with [a term’s] ordinary usage, but at least to the extent that there are permissible
variations in the ordinary concept of ‘children’ we deem state law controlling.” Id. at 581.
A gender-neutral definition of marriage that is recognized in at least nine states, the
District of Columbia, nine foreign countries, and Merriam Webster’s dictionary, is arguably
far from “entirely strange” to those familiar with the term. Interestingly, unlike the Ninth
Circuit in Adams, the Supreme Court majority in De Sylva did not attempt to discern the
intent of Congress, absent any express provision indicating a desire to depart from state
law definitions in the area of family law.
66. Federal courts have long recognized family law as a matter of almost exclusive
state jurisdiction. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564, 624 (1995) (Chief Justice
Rehnquist, for the Court, and Justice Breyer, in dissent, both seem to agree that marriage
regulation is a matter of state, not federal, authority); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404
(1975) (upholding a residence requirement for divorce under the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and explaining that domestic relations is “an area that has
long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States. Cases decided by this
Court over a period of more than a century bear witness to this historical fact”); Ohio ex.
rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1930) (refusing to decide a suit for divorce
against the Vice-Consul of Romania under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction under
Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution “in all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls” because “the whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife . . . belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States”
(quoting In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890)); N. Securities Co. v. United States,
193 U.S. 197, 402 (1904) (Holmes, C.J., dissenting) (“Commerce depends upon population,
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INS, Circuit Judge Kozinski pointed out that “federal law virtually
always relies on state law to define personal and family relation-
ships.” 67 For example, federal bankruptcy law relies on state concepts
of property rights.68 Federal criminal law looks to the nature of state
convictions to determine whether a federal law against possession of
a firearm by a felon is triggered.69 Federal authorities also frequently
rely on state crimes as predicates for RICO offenses.70 Most relevantly,
state definitions of marriage are generally used to determine federal
issues related to taxation,71 social security,72 or copyright law.73 As
demonstrated in the following Part, this has also been the prevailing
rule throughout the history of U.S. immigration laws referencing
“marriage” and “spouse.”
III. ANALYZING WHETHER A MARRIAGE IS A “MARRIAGE” UNDER
THE INA
Section 101 of the INA is appropriately entitled “Definitions.” 74
In subsection (a) alone, it sets forth the definitions for well over fifty
but Congress could not, on that ground, undertake to regulate marriage and divorce.”);
Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) (“Within the States of the Union, the whole
subject of the domestic relations . . . belongs to the laws of the State, and not to the laws
of the United States.” (citing In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at 593-94)); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. at
593-94 (“The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child,
belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877) (“The State . . . has absolute right to prescribe the con-
ditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be created, and
the causes for which it may be dissolved.”). But see Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S.
14, 19 (1946) (finding that the federal Mann Act constitutionally criminalizes polygamy
under Congress’s commerce clause authority).
67. Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
68. Id. (quoting Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)) (“Congress has gen-
erally left the determination of property rights in the assets of a bankrupt’s estate to state
law.”); Barnhill v. Johnson, 503 U.S. 393, 398 (1992) (“In the absence of any controlling
federal law, ‘property’ and ‘interests in property’ are creatures of state law.”).
69. Kahn, 36 F.3d at 1417 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Meeks,
987 F.2d 575,577 (9th Cir. 1993) and United States v. Frushon, 10 F.3d 663, 665-66 (9th
Cir. 1993)).
70. Id. (citing United States v. Freeman, 6 F.3d 586, 596 (9th Cir. 1993) (“reviewing
RICO conviction that was based in part on ‘predicate state law bribery crimes’ ”) and
Meeks, 987 F.2d at 577 (Missouri burglary offense defined a felon for purposes of federal
law prohibiting firearms possession)).
71. Id.; see also United States v. Mitchell, 403 U.S. 190, 197 (1971) (citation omitted)
(“[W]ith respect to community income . . . federal income tax liability follows ownership.
In the determination of ownership, state law controls.”); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101,
117-18 (1930) (citation omitted) (“[D]ifferences of state law, which may bring a person
within or without the category designated by Congress as taxable, may not be read into
the Revenue Act to spell out a lack of uniformity.”).
72. Kahn, 36 F.3d at 1417 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (noting that “social security benefits
often hinge on marital status” as defined by state law) (citing Califano v. Jobst, 434 U.S.
47, 52-53 n.8 (1977) and Purganan v. Schweiker, 665 F.2d 269, 271 (9th Cir. 1982)).
73. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
74. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006).
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terms used throughout the Act. Subsection (b) includes two sub-
subsections, seven subdivisions of those sub-subsections, and numer-
ous more detailed sub-subdivisions, elaborating on the meaning of the
word “child.” 75 In contrast, the only definition of the words “spouse”
and “marriage” in section 101, or anywhere else in the INA, is found
at section 101(a)(35), which states, in its entirety: “The term ‘spouse’,
‘wife’, or ‘husband’ does not include a spouse, wife, or husband by rea-
son of any marriage ceremony where the contracting parties thereto
are not physically present in the presence of each other, unless the
marriage shall have been consummated.” 76
Although the INA does not generally define the terms “marriage”
and “spouse,” it does now expressly require an attestation that a
marriage was valid where celebrated.77 This codifies the longtime rule
underlying step one of the test for marriage recognition described in
Part II above. This rare provision relating to marriage validity under
the INA lends support to the argument that the overriding congres-
sional intent with regard to marriage recognition in the INA is con-
tinued deference to the states and, particularly, the rules of the place
where the marriage was celebrated. It also implies congressional
approval of the traditional presumption of universal validity of mar-
riages valid where celebrated.
While offering no general definition of “marriage,” the INA does
expressly set out certain evidentiary requirements related to mar-
riage bona fides. For instance, it requires applicants for marriage-
based conditional permanent residence to provide a “[s]tatement of
proper marriage,” including an assurance that the marriage “was not
entered into for the purpose of procuring an alien’s admission as an
immigrant; and [that] . . . no fee or other consideration was given . . .
for the filing.” 78
The level of detail in the definition of other terms and the spe-
cific enumeration of evidence of marital bona fides demonstrates that
Congress did not simply forget to delve into the traditional state area
of family law to create a separate federal definition of marriage. The
express language requiring an attestation that the marriage was
valid where celebrated evidences both the importance of this factor
and congressional deference to the marriage law of jurisdictions that
have general competence in that area, states and foreign nations.
There have been well over 100 recorded appeals of disputes regard-
ing the meaning of “marriage” and “spouse” under U.S. immigration
75. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(b)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(b)(1)-(2).
76. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35).
77. Immigration and Nationality Act § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(i).
78. Immigration and Nationality Act § 216(d)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A) (internal
numerals omitted).
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law since those terms became the basis for quota preferences for the
spouses of U.S. citizens in 1924.79 For this reason, it seems extremely
unlikely that Congress assumed it was using a clear term when it
failed to define “marriage,” as it amended and redrafted that im-
migration law well over 100 times since 1924.80 Congress was likely
aware of the inter-jurisdictional conflicts, and its silence demon-
strated an unwillingness to resolve them by creating a general fed-
eral definition of “marriage.” Therefore, the BIA and most federal
courts have wisely focused on state law in determining whether a
“marriage” is valid for immigration purposes.81 As the BIA recently
observed, while “the ultimate issue of the validity of a marriage for
immigration purposes is one of Federal law, that law has, from the
inception of our nation, recognized that the regulation of marriage
is almost exclusively a State matter.” 82
A. The General Rule: Marriages Valid Where “Celebrated” are
Valid Everywhere
Generally, a marriage valid where celebrated is valid every-
where. This principle is well settled under both conflict of law rules
and immigration law.83 The BIA has explained that this rule of recog-
nition was developed because “[i]nfinite mischief and confusion would
ensue with respect to legitimacy, succession, and other rights if the
79. A simple Lexis search for “immediate relatives and spouse and marriage and
INA” revealed 117 cases in the database of Federal Immigration Cases and Agency
Decisions. The Immigration Act of 1924 incorporated the first adoption of quota limi-
tations for foreign nationals who were not excluded under specific racist limitations like
the Chinese Exclusion Acts. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., LEGISLATION FROM
1910-1940, http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Legislation%20from%201901-1940
.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). The Immigration Act of 1924 was largely rethought and
reformulated in 1952, 1965, and 1990, without defining the omnipresent terms
“marriage” and “spouse.” See U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv., Immigration Legal
History, Historical Immigration and Naturalization Legislation, http://www.uscis.gov
(search U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services website for “Historical Immigration
Legislation”; then follow “Historical Immigration and Naturalization Legislation”
hyperlink under “Search Results”) (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) [hereinafter Immigration
Legal History] (providing links to PDF documents that describe these reformulations).
80. Immigration Legal History, supra note 79 (providing links to PDF documents
that briefly describe each of these legislative changes).
81. Only the two Ninth Circuit opinions discussed in Part IV, infra, have implied that
“marriage” under the INA has an independent federal definition.
82. See In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 751 (B.I.A. 2005) (recognizing the mar-
riage of a man to a transsexual woman under the INA, since it was recognized as a valid
heterosexual marriage under state law).
83. Patterson v. Gaines, 47 U.S. 550, 587-89 (1848) (citing Phillips v. Gregg, 10 Watts
158, 168 (1840) and Lacon v. Higgins, 3 Stark. 178, 171 Eng. Rep. 813 (1822)); Jahed v.
Acri, 468 F.3d 230, 235 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted); In re Luna, 18 I. & N. Dec. 385,
386 (B.I.A. 1983).
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validity of the marriage contract were not to be tested by the laws of
the country where it was made.” 84
The BIA apparently follows this general rule no matter how
unfriendly the country or how illegitimate the legal system. For in-
stance, two BIA cases soon after World War II carefully examined
“the Hitler discriminatory legislation concerning interracial mar-
riages” to determine the validity of “marriages” for U.S. immigration
purposes.85 The Board based its decisions on the “Hitler Law” regard-
ing marriage and divorce even though the divorce in one case was
coerced by Gestapo torture.86
1. Meeting Procedural Marriage Requirements
In most cases, a married couple followed the law in the juris-
diction where it was married, and it merely needs to document that
process for U.S. immigration officials.87 Marriage laws do vary widely
around the globe, however, and there have been some disputes in U.S.
immigration forums regarding the sufficiency of certain ceremonies
or procedures in a foreign or U.S. state jurisdiction.88
While the very different ceremonial requirements of foreign or
state marriage regimes vary greatly, most BIA cases rely entirely on
whether the marriage is recognized under the law of the jurisdiction
where it was celebrated. Following this rule, the Board has recognized
a marriage in Macao (“Portuguese China”) by Chinese ceremonial cus-
tom even though the husband was so confused about that marriage’s
validity that he indicated to U.S. immigration officials that he was
single when he subsequently entered the United States.89 The Board
has recognized religious ceremonies in countries where they are
legally valid,90 and has generally refused to recognize these cere-
monies if they were not valid where celebrated.91
84. In re C---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 632, 636 (B.I.A. 1952) (citing 2 KENT’S COMMENTARIES 92).
85. In re M---, 3 I. & N. Dec. 850, 851-52, 855-56 (B.I.A. 1950); In re P--- & S---, 5 I.
& N. Dec. 1, 4-5 (B.I.A. 1947).
86. In re P--- and S---, 5 I. & N. Dec. at 1-3.
87. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 9 FOREIGN AFF. MANUAL: VISAS, 40.1 NOTES 1.1(c)
(2009), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/86920.pdf (“The under-
lying principle in determining the validity of the marriage is that the law of the place of
marriage celebration controls. If the law is complied with and the marriage is recognized,
then the marriage is deemed to be valid for immigration purposes.”).
88. In re L---, 7 I. & N. Dec. 587, 588-89 (B.I.A. 1957).
89. Id. at 588-90.
90. See, e.g., In re Rice, 16 I. & N. Dec. 96, 97-98 (B.I.A. 1977) (concluding that although
a marriage did not follow all the required procedures in the Philippines, it would have been
valid there, so it is also valid for U.S. immigration purposes); In re Duran-Montoya, 10 I.
& N. Dec. 767, 767-69 (B.I.A. 1963) (finding that a man was not “living in a husband and
wife relationship” with the woman he married in Miami because of the continuing validity
of his previous unregistered religious marriage, which was recognized as valid in Colombia).
91. Validity of Iranian Mosque Marriages Performed in Turkey, Op. INS Gen. Couns.
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In a few unusual instances, the Board has been willing to stray
from its focus on the validity of a marriage where celebrated,92 but
these are rare and particularly compelling exceptions. For instance,
the BIA has recognized the child of a foreign marriage as “legitimate”
even though the couple did not fulfill all of the technical requirements
of the jurisdiction in question.93 It has also recognized the validity
of a religious ceremony that may not have been considered valid in
Italy.94 In In re Coletti, the court apparently made an exception be-
cause the man was attempting to game the system by immigrating to
the United States under the more favorable quota preference category
for the “unmarried son” of a U.S. permanent resident after marrying
his pregnant girlfriend in a Catholic religious ceremony in Italy.95
91-58 (July 25, 1991) (finding that an Iranian mosque marriage performed in Turkey is
not valid under the INA because it is not valid under Turkish law); see also In re
Rodriguez-Cruz, 18 I. & N. Dec. 72, 73-74 (B.I.A. 1981) (refusing to recognize a religious
marriage ceremony in Mexico because it was not performed in accordance with civil
formalities); In re Lwin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 1, 2 (B.I.A. 1976) (refusing to recognize marriage
where none was registered with the Registrar as required for Christians under the laws
of Burma); In re Leon, 15 I. & N. Dec. 248, 248-49 (B.I.A. 1975) (refusing to recognize the
legitimacy of a man born after his parents’ religious ceremony but before they underwent
a civil ceremony in Mexico, because the civil code of the State of Michoacán, Mexico, only
recognized civil marriages, and distinguishing In re Hernandez, 14 I. & N. Dec. 608, 614-15
(B.I.A. 1973; A.G. 1974), because the common law marriage recognized in that case was
valid in the State of Tamaulipas, Mexico).
92. In Kahn v. INS, the Ninth Circuit also recognized the unmarried heterosexual
partner of a U.S. citizen for purposes of waiver of deportation under INA § 212(c). 36
F.3d 1412, 1413-14, 1416 (9th Cir. 1994). The problem of that split decision and Adams
v. Howerton are discussed in detail in Part IV infra.
93. In re K---, 7 I. & N. Dec. 492, 492-94 (B.I.A. 1957). In In re K---, the BIA recog-
nized the legitimacy of the adult son of a couple who had an Orthodox Jewish wedding,
even though there was evidence that the marriage was not recognized under the Italian
civil law, since the couple entered their marriage in good faith under “the color of a
marriage ceremony.” Id. at 494. The Board explained that when the man “has always
believed that his parents were lawfully married and that he was a legitimate child, I see
no public advantage in making a search of the laws of some foreign state in order to prove
that his parents were living in sin and that he is a bastard.” Id. This case probably says
more about the changing view of legitimacy in the latter half of the twentieth century
than it does about the broader question of marital validity. In re Coletti, 11 I. & N. Dec.
551 (B.I.A. 1965), discussed the presumption in favor of validity in a line of religious
marriage cases, tracing them to a 1933 opinion of the Solicitor of Labor (Labor was the
federal department responsible for immigration at the time) dealing with the legitimacy
of the children upon the same rationale later cited in In re K---. In re Coletti, 11 I. & N.
Dec. at 556. In fact, in spite of the broadly accepted view that U.S. public policy opposes
any recognition of polygamous marriages, there have also been cases recognizing the
children of those marriages as “legitimate” for immigration purposes. In re Mahal, 12 I.
& N. Dec. 409, 410 (B.I.A. 1967); In re B---S---, 6 I. & N. Dec. 305, 305, 308-09 (B.I.A. 1955).
94. In re Coletti, 11 I. & N. Dec. at 554-55.
95. Id. at 552. There was expert testimony that reporting the marriage under the civil
law was “not merely a ministerial act but that the transcription ha[d] a constitutive effect.”
Id. The Board focused instead on the fact that the validity of the marriage under Italian
law dated back to the time of the religious ceremony once it was recorded and on its
conviction that:
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Although it normally assesses the law of the place of marriage
celebration de novo, the BIA has also “felt constrained” to recognize
the final judgment of a U.S. state court with regard to the validity
of a foreign marriage, even where the BIA had a “concern with the
procedure used to establish the validity of [that] marriage.” 96 Like
many other aspects of federal recognition of marriages for immi-
gration purposes, this opinion echoes federal Full Faith and Credit
Clause jurisprudence.97
2. Celebration Without a Ceremony: Common Law Marriage
Despite the INA’s and BIA’s language about marital “celebration,”
so-called “common law” marriages (marriages based on cohabitation
without an official ceremony or registration) are recognized under the
INA so long as they were valid where the cohabitation took place.98
As in other cases evaluating the validity of a marriage for immigration
purposes, the focus is on the law of the state or country where the
marriage allegedly occurred.99
Congress did not intend that the benefits of third preference status extended
to unmarried sons or daughters who were regarded as part of the primary
family unit, were to be easily circumvented by an alien who entered into a
marriage relationship which because of some technicality of foreign law did
not become formally final until after gaining status under the “unmarried
son” visa category.
Id. at 554.
96. In re Kwan, 11 I. & N. Dec. 205, 206, 208 (B.I.A. 1965) (relying on a judgment of the
Circuit Court of the State of Michigan to affirm the validity of a Venezuelan marriage
under Michigan law despite the presence of a Chinese marriage certificate reflecting a
prior purported marriage that had not been terminated, finding that “[t]he wisest course
would be to accept at face value the marital status recognized in conformity with the
laws of the state”).
97. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing the Full Faith and Credit
clause and the binding effect of final court judgments).
98. Common Law Marriage and Conditional Permanent Residence — Texas Declaration
and Registration of Informal Marriage, Op. INS Gen. Couns. 95-8 (Aug. 26, 1995) [herein-
after 1995 Opinion on Common Law Marriage].
99. Id. (citing In re P---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 610, 614 (B.I.A. 1952; A.G. 1952)); see, e.g., In re
Schaad, 10 I. & N. Dec. 555 (B.I.A. 1964) (refusing to recognize a longtime cohabitating
couple as married because the law of Hungary, where they had lived together does not
recognize such relationships as common law marriages). In re Schaad presents some
parallel considerations to a recognized same-sex civil union, domestic partnership, or
other legally recognized, non-marital relationship. Long-term cohabiting partners were
legally recognized for some purposes under Hungarian law, but the relationship was not
recognized as a “marriage” with all of its legal consequences (e.g., such cohabitants were
not treated like a spouse with regard to alimony or intestate inheritance). Id. at 558-59.
Of course, one might distinguish U.S. civil unions or domestic partnerships from the
legal cohabitants in In re Schaad on at least two grounds: (1) many non-marital same-sex
regimes in the United States actually do entail all of the same state rights as marriage;
and (2) the Hungarian couple in In re Schaad did actually have the choice of entering a
fully recognized legal marriage.
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In most marriage cases, there is little difficulty determining
where a marriage was “celebrated.” It is where a license was issued,
where a ceremony occurred, or where the marriage was registered.
In the case of “common law” marriage, the jurisdiction is also clear
if the couple has only lived in one place throughout their entire re-
lationship. It may be less obvious, however, if the couple has moved
around over time.
If the relevant jurisdiction is a country or U.S. state that recog-
nizes common law marriage and the couple met the requirements of
that jurisdiction, the marriage will be recognized for immigration pur-
poses.100 Immigration officials consider the validity of the marriage
according to the specific requirements of the particular jurisdiction
where it was allegedly contracted.101 In addition, they apparently must
limit their inquiry regarding the legal validity of the marriage to the
standard of proof required by the relevant states.102 Of course, this
limitation restricts very little in practice, since officials still have
broad discretion to examine additional evidence to determine that
the marriage is a bona fide one, not a relationship contracted solely
for the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.103
100. 1995 Opinion on Common Law Marriage, supra note 98; see also In re Garcia, 16
I. & N. Dec. 623, 624 (B.I.A. 1978) (looking at specific requirements of Texas statutory
and case law to determine that a common law marriage had not been established); In re
A---E---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 405, 407-08 (B.I.A. 1951) (holding that a Mexican religious ceremony
did not result in a valid marriage, but that a common law marriage, valid for immigration
purposes, was later contracted in Texas, a state that recognizes common law marriage).
This applies to both U.S. states and foreign countries, but the “spouses would bear the
burden of proving that the relevant foreign law recognizes common law marriage.” 1995
Opinion on Common Law Marriage, supra note 98, at n.1 (citation omitted).
101. See, e.g., In re Garcia, 16 I. & N. Dec. 623, 624 (B.I.A. 1978) (looking to Texas case
law for the “acid test” of common law marriage: whether the couple held themselves out
to the public as married); In re Megalogenis, 10 I. & N. Dec. 609, 610-11 (B.I.A. 1964)
(recognizing for immigration purposes the common law marriage of a couple, even though
the couple had not cohabited or consummated the relationship, since these were not
requirements under Pennsylvania law if a couple verbally contracted a common-law
marriage); In re H---T---W---, 8 I. & N. Dec. 562 , 564 (B.I.A. 1960) (applying the test under
New York case law to find that a cohabitating couple without the requisite mutuality of
consent had not entered a common law marriage). In In re Megalogenis, the BIA clearly
expressed the mandatory nature of its deference to state law in this regard, explaining,
“[s]ince the law of the State of Pennsylvania Controls [sic] in this matter we have no
alternative but to rule that the petitioner is the lawful wife of the beneficiary.” In re
Megalogenis, 10 I. & N. Dec. at 610-11.
102. 1995 Opinion on Common Law Marriage, supra note 98; see also In re Carrubba,
11 I. & N. Dec. 914, 918 (B.I.A. 1966) (refusing to recognize a common law marriage
when the evidence “falls far short of the standard set forth by the Ohio courts to
establish such a marriage — i.e., clear and convincing evidence”); In re F---, 5 I. & N.
Dec. 163, 164, 166-67 (B.I.A. 1953) (finding a valid common law marriage under the law
of New York, and relying on the presumption of validity established by such a marriage
in New York, even in the absence of evidence of divorce in a prior English marriage;
interestingly, the BIA shifted the burden of proof regarding the first marriage to the
government in light of this New York presumption of validity).
103. See infra Part III.C.1 (discussing “marriage fraud” in the immigration context).
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One could argue that common law marriages should not be rec-
ognized under the INA because it was not specifically intended by
Congress, but at least one federal court has expressly rejected that
argument.104 In United States v. Gomez-Orozco, a district court judge
found that “Congress has clearly indicated [in parts of the INA] that
the term ‘marriage’ would be defined by state law, at least insofar as
the marriage conformed to common understandings of the term.”105
Therefore, since “[s]everal states recognize common law marriages,”
the court reasoned that “Congress intended to include those common
law marriages . . . under the [INA].”106
Back in 1877, when most states still recognized common law
marriage, the Supreme Court held that “[m]arriage is everywhere
regarded as a civil contract. Statutes in many of the States, it is true,
regulate the mode of entering into the contract, but they do not confer
the right.”107 Therefore, the Court held that the continued right to
common law marriage is presumed unless a state expressly negates
that common law right.108 But this common law right was whittled
away over the following century. By 1995, “only thirteen states [recog-
nized] common law marriage,”109 and that number has now shrunk
to just ten states and the District of Columbia.110
B. Exceptions Based on the Strongly Held Public Policy of the
State of Domicile or Intended Domicile
The United States and all its constituent states unanimously rec-
ognize that a marriage, valid where celebrated, is valid everywhere.111
104. United States v. Gomez-Orozco, 28 F. Supp. 2d 1092, 1095-97 (C.D. Ill. 1998).
105. Id. at 1096. The potential qualification related to the “common understandings
of the term” marriage refers to the government’s reliance on Adams v. Howerton, 673
F.2d 1036 (9th Cir. 1982), which focused on the dictionary meaning of the word “marriage”
to construct a congressional intent not to recognize a same-sex marriage when it used
the word. Judge Mills in Gomez-Orozco expressed no opinion regarding the legitimacy
of that logic from Adams v. Howerton. Explaining that while “perhaps it is plausible to
conclude that” same-sex marriages are not valid under the INA, “the ordinary meaning
[of ‘marriage’] seems plainly to include common law marriages.” Id. In the end, the court
was more focused on Congress’s intent that the term “marriage” be defined by the relevant
state law. Id.
106. Id.
107. Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76, 78 (1877).
108. Id. at 79.
109. 1995 Opinion on Common Law Marriage, supra note 98 (citing Ellen Kandoian,
Cohabitation, Common Law Marriage, and the Possibility of a Shared Moral Life, 75
GEO. L.J. 1829, 1831 n.11 (1987) for the proposition that “[f]or many years, only thirteen
states allowed common law marriage”).
110. John L. McCormack, Title to Property, Title to Marriage: The Social Foundation
of Adverse Possession and Common Law Marriage, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 461, 467 (2008).
111. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing the rule of marriage
validity).
2010] THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 565
This rule is based on the doctrine of comity with regard to foreign
marriages and judgments, and the constitutional full faith and credit
commandment with regard to the marriages recognized in other U.S.
states. U.S. immigration law has reflected this rule of recognition
since at least 1924.112
State courts have occasionally recognized exceptions to the gen-
eral rule of recognition if there is a strong public policy objection to a
given marriage by the jurisdiction where couples are domiciled. The
BIA and federal courts sometimes recognize these exceptions under
the INA as well. A stronger state public policy appears to be necessary
to refuse recognition of a marriage under the INA than that sufficient
to justify state refusal to recognize a marriage under the doctrine of
comity or the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
1. Anti-Miscegenation Laws
It is now hard to fathom, but in 1949, thirty U.S. states prohibited
the marriage of men and women of different races; this prohibition
was even incorporated into six state constitutions.113 As late as 1967
when the United States Supreme Court finally held such laws un-
constitutional, seventeen states still maintained anti-miscegenation
laws prohibiting biracial marriages.114
There are only two reported cases concerning the recognition
of biracial marriages for immigration purposes in spite of the preva-
lence of state anti-miscegenation laws into the second half of the
twentieth century.115 This dearth of cases may be the result of both
social stigma and U.S. immigration trends and immigration policies
that overwhelmingly favored European immigration until the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act of 1952 finally made all races eligible
for naturalization.116
112. See, e.g., Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 713, 717 (D. Mass. 1924) (finding that a proxy
marriage was valid in Pennsylvania because it was valid in Portugal, where it was
celebrated).
113. In re D---, 3 I. & N. Dec. 480, 483 n.2 (B.I.A. 1949) (citing Perez v. Sharp, 198 P.2d
17, 38 (Cal. 1948) (Shenk, J., dissenting)).
114. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 6, 11-12 (1967) (holding anti-miscegenation laws
unconstitutional under both the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
115. See infra notes 119-123 (discussing In re D---, 3 I. & N. Dec. 480 (B.I.A. 1949)) and
notes 124-130 (discussing In re C---, 7 I. & N. Dec. 108 (B.I.A. 1956)).
116. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 97.6% of foreign-born people in the United
States in 1950 were “white.” U.S. Census Bureau, Table 9, Race and Hispanic Origin of
the Foreign-Born Population: 1850 to 1990 (Mar. 9, 1999), http://www.census.gov/
population/www/documentation/twps0029/tab09.html. The total number of foreign-born
people of “races other than white” had increased to only 4.6% by 1960, just seven years
before the United States Supreme Court struck down all remaining state immigration
laws in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). Id.
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The two BIA cases addressing the validity of marriages in light
of anti-miscegenation laws fit within the analytical pattern described
in Part II above. The BIA limited its test of “marriage” validity under
the INA to an inquiry of whether a marriage violated express state
criminal law provisions against miscegenation or against evasion of
those provisions, read narrowly.117 Although litigants challenged the
constitutionality of discriminatory anti-miscegenation laws under
the Equal Protection Clause in these cases, the Board found no vio-
lation of federal public policy, nor did it infer any non-discriminatory
or other federal definition of “marriage” and “spouse” under U.S.
immigration law.118
In In re D---, the BIA upheld a decision of the Immigration and
the Naturalization Service (INS or Service)119 Central Office refusing
to recognize the legal Canadian marriage of a white Norwegian im-
migrant and a U.S. citizen of African descent.120 The INS noted that
the couple, which actually resided in North Dakota, had travelled to
Canada to marry “for the purpose of circumventing” North Dakota’s
criminal law prohibiting “cohabitation and marriages between negroes
and white persons.”121 It cited numerous cases for the proposition
The history of overtly racist policies in U.S. immigration law is undeniable. From at
least the time of the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, which barred Chinese nationals from
becoming U.S. citizens, until enactment of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
the U.S. government enforced systematic rules to discourage or eliminate immigration
for various groups of non-white people. The Library of Congress, Anti-Chinese Movement
and Chinese Exclusion, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/award99/cubhtml/theme9.html (last
visited Feb. 24, 2010). These policies apparently caused some Americans to lose their
U.S. citizenship just because they married someone from Asian countries. Toshiko Inaba
v. Nagle, 36 F.2d 481, 481 (9th Cir. 1929) (citing 8 U.S.C.A. § 9 for the proposition that
“a native-born citizen of the United States” could lose “her citizenship by reason of her
marriage to an alien ineligible to [sic] citizenship”). They also led to perverse legal disputes
regarding who was “white.” See infra note 167 (discussing a range of cases that attempted
to define “white”).
117. For discussion of the relationship between criminal law and a “sufficient” public
policy against miscegenation, see infra notes 120-133 and accompanying text.
118. In re C---, 7 I. & N. Dec. 108 (B.I.A. 1956); In re D---, 3 I. & N. Dec. 480, 481-83
(B.I.A. 1949).
119. The agency/agencies responsible for immigration benefits, immigration enforce-
ment, and border control have been moved from the U.S. Department of Commerce to
the Department of Labor to the Department of Justice to the Department of Homeland
Security over the last century. The agency itself was called the Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service (INS) for most of that time. After September 11, 2001, when the World
Trade Center was destroyed by foreign terrorists who had entered the United States
legally, the INS was moved from the Justice Department into the new Department of
Homeland Security, and its three main functions were split among three new agencies:
ICE (Immigration and Customs Enforcement), CBP (Customs and Border Protection),
and USCIS (Citizenship and Immigration Services). U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Our History, http://www.uscis.gov (click the “About Us” tab; then click the “Our
History” link on the left side of the page) (last visited Feb. 24, 2010).
120. In re D---, 3 I. & N. Dec. at 480, 482-83.
121. Id. at 481. This evasion law was similar to the Virginia law under which the
Lovings were convicted in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 4 (1967).
2010] THE MEANING OF MARRIAGE 567
that states may forbid marriages between persons of different races
in order to promote the general welfare.122 Not only did the Service
refuse to recognize this marriage because it was invalid in the state
where the couple resided, but it found an additional reason to deport
the Norwegian based on bad character as exemplified by his “disre-
gard of law . . . substantiated by [the] testimony that he ‘married’ in
Canada to circumvent the law of North Dakota.”123
Later, in In re C---, the BIA again addressed a state anti-miscege-
nation law, this time indirectly.124 That case actually hinged upon a
finding that a Filipino man could not establish “good moral character”
because of an adulterous relationship with a woman he eventually
married in California.125
When the man married his first wife in the District of Columbia,
they were domiciled in Maryland, which prohibited the marriage or
“cohabitation of members of the white and Malay races.”126 The
Filipino man cited In re D--- for the proposition that his first mar-
riage was invalid, so he could not have committed “adultery” prior to
his second marriage.127 The BIA disagreed.
The Maryland Code stated that:
All marriages between a white person . . . and a member of the
Malay race, . . . are forever prohibited, and shall be void; and any
person violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed
guilty of an infamous crime, and punished by imprisonment in
the penitentiary not less than eighteen months nor more than
ten years.128
The Board distinguished this statutory language from that in In re
D---, since the Maryland law did not prohibit interracial cohabitation
generally like the law of North Dakota and since this “Maryland stat-
ute is not expressly made applicable to marriages performed in other
states between residents of Maryland.”129 Quoting from Corpus Juris
Secundum (C.J.S.), the Board explained that a marriage that is
valid where celebrated “ ‘will be held valid everywhere . . . . The fact
122. In re D---, 3 I. & N. Dec. at 482.
123. Id. at 483.
124. 7 I. & N. Dec. 108, 108-09 (B.I.A. 1956).
125. Id. at 108.
126. Id. at 109, 111.
127. Id. at 112.
128. Id. at 110 (citing MD. CODE. ANN., art. 27 § 466 (1951), “which is identical with
section 445 of the 1939 Code”).
129. In re C---, 7 I. & N. Dec. 108, 112 (B.I.A. 1956). Although it discussed these issues
at length, the BIA eventually recognized in In re C--- that the relevant inquiry actually
regarded the validity of the District of Columbia marriage in California, where the
allegedly adulterous relationship took place. Id. at 111.
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that the parties to the marriage left their domicile for the purpose
of evading its laws which would have rendered the marriage invalid
does not alter the general rule, unless a statute expressly provides
to the contrary.’ ”130
The North Dakota anti-miscegenation law in In re D--- was a
criminal prohibition.131 The BIA, however, was not clear on whether
it would have mattered if North Dakota had merely refused to rec-
ognize biracial marriages, particularly in light of the evasion finding
in that case. BIA precedent, including In re C--- and opinions related
to other categories of marriage, indicates that a non-criminal anti-
miscegenation law would not have been enough.
One aspect of In re C--- that remains particularly interesting
today is the BIA’s reading of the Maryland statute. It found no state
public policy sufficient to invalidate the marriage for immigration
purposes in spite of the couple’s evasion of a Maryland law that
defined such a marriage as “forever prohibited,” “void,” and “an in-
famous crime.”132 Apparently, only violation of an anti-cohabitation
criminal prohibition or an express statute criminalizing the evasion
of Maryland’s anti-miscegenation law would have been sufficient to
trigger an immigration law exception.133 This reading of the cases is
consistent with that applied to other disputed categories of marriage,
such as those between close relatives.
2. Consanguinity (Uncles, Nieces and Cousins)
Unlike the recognition of biracial marriages, marriages between
close relatives have been the subject of numerous recorded cases since
at least 1901.134 All of these cases turn on the law of two jurisdictions:
130. Id. at 109 (quoting 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 4).
131. Section 14-0304 of the North Dakota Revised Code of 1943 provided that:
No white person residing or being in this state shall intermarry with any
negro person. Every such marriage shall be void. Each of the contracting
parties, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the peniten-
tiary for a term of not more than ten years, or by a fine of not more than two
thousand dollars, or by both. . . .
N.D. REV. CODE § 14-0304 (1943) (repealed 1955).
132. In re C---, 7 I. & N. Dec. at 110-11.
133. Id.
134. See United States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, 109 F. 886, 887-88 (E.D. Pa. 1901)
(finding that a valid Russian uncle-niece marriage was not valid for immigration purposes
because the State of Pennsylvania would not recognize it, and because the couple could
be criminally prosecuted for cohabiting together in that state). Note: the cases discussed
all involve the marriages of uncles, nieces and cousins, which were allegedly valid where
celebrated. There was dicta in several of these cases that laws against nature (polygamy
and some incestuous relationships) are generally excepted because they “violate the law
of nature.” A more modern, but similar formulation of this idea, delineates a general
exception for “polygamous marriages or one [sic] that is by all civilized nations regarded
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(1) the state or country where the marriage was celebrated, and (2) the
couple’s state of domicile (or of intended domicile) in the United States.
As with biracial marriages, no case of consanguinity has turned on
any implied federal definition or policy.
As the BIA has explained, “Congress has not expressed any public
policy excluding a spouse on the ground of consanguinity and . . . im-
migration laws are silent on this point; recourse must be had to state
law for expressions of such public policy.”135 Generally, so long as
the couple’s relationship would not violate the strong public policy
expressed in the criminal law of its state of domicile, the marriage
is valid for U.S. immigration purposes.136 “The presumption of the
validity of a marriage duly celebrated is a very strong one and should
be overturned reluctantly, and then only by persuasive specific evi-
dence requiring a contrary finding.”137
a. 1933 Opinion of the Attorney General
In 1933, the United States Attorney General published a detailed
opinion entitled “Issuance of Immigration Visa to an Alien Woman
Married to her Uncle,” examining the marriage of a Polish niece and
her U.S. citizen uncle and laying out appropriate factors to consider
in determining whether any particular foreign marriage between
an uncle and niece is valid under U.S. immigration law.138 Attorney
General Mitchell focused on the law of Poland, where the marriage
was celebrated, and the law of Virginia, where the uncle had estab-
lished residency.139 There was no dispute that the marriage was valid
in Poland. The State of Virginia, however, prohibited both marriages
between uncles and nieces and evasion of Virginia’s law by leaving
the state “for the purpose of being married, and with the intention
of returning” after marrying an uncle or niece elsewhere.140
In either case, the newlyweds were subject to criminal prosecu-
tion.141 The Attorney General, however, found that Virginia did not
as incestuous and immoral.” In re C---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 632, 636 (B.I.A. 1952); see also In
re T---, 8 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531 (B.I.A. 1960) (viewing polygamy and incest as “immoral
by the law of civilized nations”). The Board reasoned that uncle-niece marriages could not
be subject to such a general exception, because they were valid in many “civilized” foreign
countries (Russia, Poland, Germany, and Italy) and at least one U.S. state (Rhode Island).
In re C---, 4 I. & N. Dec. at 636-37.
135. In re T---, 8 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531 (B.I.A. 1960) (citing the 1933 Attorney General
Opinion, supra note 34).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. 1933 Attorney General Opinion, supra note 34, at 102-03.
139. Id. at 103-04.
140. Id. (citing section 4540 of the Virginia Code of 1930).
141. Id.
570 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW                  [Vol. 16:537
forbid an uncle-niece couple from living there together as man and
wife, so long as they did not marry inside the state of Virginia or in-
tentionally travel to another jurisdiction for the purpose of evading
Virginia’s marriage laws.142 Although he admitted a “great [deal of]
difficulty in arriving at a satisfactory conclusion” in the case,143 the
Attorney General finally concluded that the Polish marriage was valid
for immigration purposes, so long as the uncle travelled to Poland
without the intention of marrying his niece.144
The Attorney General’s analysis focused on state law. Because the
District of Columbia and forty-seven of the then forty-eight U.S. states
all specifically prohibited the contracting of uncle-niece marriages,
he found it important that at least one U.S. state, Rhode Island, did
permit uncle-niece marriages.145 Noting that Congress only defined
the term “marriage” in the context of proxy marriage, he analyzed the
validity of the marriage on the basis of state law.146 He explained that
if an uncle and niece “could lawfully cohabit together as husband and
wife” in no place in the United States, he would have “unhesitatingly
conclude[d]” that the couple’s marriage was not valid under U.S. im-
migration law, “because there is a clear implication from the statute
that persons who cannot lawfully maintain the relation of husband
and wife within the United States are not admissible because of that
relation.”147 Congress would not silently undermine state law by grant-
ing advantageous federal immigration benefits to couples based on
“marriages” when the couples could not lawfully live together as man
and wife in any U.S. state.
It is noteworthy that the Attorney General inferred nothing
regarding the specific intent of Congress to silently create a federal
definition of “marriage” based on the status quo in almost all states.148
In fact, he rejected the argument that Congress had demonstrated
a federal public policy against recognizing uncle-niece marriages by
expressly prohibiting them and criminalizing cohabitation in the
142. Id. (citing an opinion of the Attorney General of Virginia).
143. Id. at 102.
144. Id. at 111.
145. Id. at 109. Rhode Island’s recognition was apparently limited to uncle-niece mar-
riages “between Jews.” Id. The court stressed this point even though the couple in question
was apparently not Jewish. It apparently placed more significance on the fact that there
were some states, including Virginia, the couple’s intended state of residence, where
“they could . . . live together without infraction of law.” Id. at 110.
146. Id. at 109.
147. Id.
148. Contrast this analysis with that of the court in Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036,
1039 (9th Cir. 1982), which apparently inferred a federal definition of what “marriage” and
“spouse” do not mean, even though it largely deferred to the states and other countries
regarding what the words do mean.
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District of Columbia and other federally controlled territories.149
Reasoning that “if Congress had intended to exclude alien wives of
citizens on the ground of consanguinity it should have declared and
announced that policy in the Immigration Act,” the Attorney General
explained that “[t]he only public policy of the United States that I am
authorized to recognize with respect to the admissibility of aliens is
that found in the immigration law.”150
b. Other Cases Regarding “Incestuous” Marriages
Federal judges and the BIA have largely followed the framework
of Attorney General Mitchell’s opinion since its issuance in 1933.
They have, however, expounded and expanded on his analysis as new
questions arose in different contexts.
After establishing that a marriage passes the threshold inquiry
regarding its validity where celebrated,151 the BIA and federal courts
generally proceed with the presumption that the marriage is valid
everywhere unless it violates the public policy of the couple’s state
of domicile,152 “distinctly expressed” in state legislation or the policy
of Congress distinctly expressed in the INA.153 Most of the BIA
149. 1933 Attorney General Opinion, supra note 34, at 109-10. Although the Attorney
General referred to “exclusion” and “inadmissibility” here, his main focus was the mean-
ing of “wife” and “marriage” under the Immigration Act of 1924. The issue regarding
“inadmissibility” apparently arose from the argument that the wife might become a
“public charge” due to imprisonment on a charge of incest. Id. at 108.
150. Id. at 110-11.
151. This is a serious step in the process of determining whether a marriage is legiti-
mate for immigration purposes. The BIA has specifically rested its refusal to recognize
some marriages on the invalidity of that marriage in the jurisdiction where it was pur-
portedly celebrated. See In re Dela Cruz, 14 I. & N. Dec. 686, 686 (B.I.A. 1974) (first cousin
marriage was no longer valid in the Philippines where it was purportedly celebrated);
In re S---, 8 I. & N. Dec. 234, 234 (B.I.A. 1958) (marriage between first cousins was not
valid in Illinois where purportedly celebrated, and, therefore, was not valid under the INA).
It has also held at least one marriage to be valid based on its validity where celebrated
without even expressly examining the law of the state where the U.S. couple lived or
intended to live. See In re Bautista, 16 I. & N. Dec. 602, 602-03 (B.I.A. 1978) (recognizing
the validity of a marriage for immigration purposes because such second-cousin marriages
are valid in the Philippines, presumably because INS raised no issue regarding the
couple’s state of domicile).
152. “Domicile” is generally “a person’s true, fixed, principal and permanent home.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 523 (8th ed. 2004). “Domicil[e] implies a nexus between person
and place of such permanence as to control the creation of legal relations and responsi-
bilities of the utmost significance.” Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
153. In re M---, 3 I. & N. Dec. 25, 26-27 (B.I.A. 1947) (recognizing a Romanian uncle-
niece marriage for New York domiciliaries although the marriage could not have been
celebrated in New York and although it was later annulled in New York); see also In re
T---, 8 I. & N. Dec. 529, 529, 531 (B.I.A. 1960) (finding a Czech uncle-niece marriage
valid for immigration purposes due to absence of strong state public policy against uncle-
niece marriages in the form of a criminal prohibition).
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opinions recognize a marriage, valid where celebrated, so long as
it does not subject the couple to criminal prosecution in its state of
domicile.154 One case even goes so far as to find a marriage valid
where the couple’s cohabitation violated state criminal law but would
not be prosecuted.155
As initially recognized by Attorney General Mitchell, there may
also be an exception to the rule of recognition even in cases where no
state law criminalizes the couple’s cohabitation. If the couple violates
a law of its state of domicile, which expressly prohibits the evasion of
its marriage laws by travelling primarily for the purpose of marrying
elsewhere and immediately returning, the BIA has stated that the
marriage will not be recognized for immigration purposes.156 However,
the only reported case that refused to recognize an extraterritorial
marriage on this basis also involved a criminal prohibition of the
154. United States ex rel. Devine v. Rodgers, 109 F. 886, 887-88 (E.D. Pa. 1901) (refusing
to recognize an uncle-niece marriage that constituted criminal incest in Pennsylvania);
In re Hirabayashi, 10 I. & N. Dec. 722, 724 (B.I.A. 1964) (recognizing the Colorado mar-
riage between first cousins residing in Illinois, since cohabitation between first cousins
is no longer a crime under Illinois statutes); In re T---, 8 I. & N. Dec. 529, 531 (B.I.A. 1960)
(finding a marriage valid since “[t]he marriage of an uncle and niece has long been con-
sidered lawful for immigration purposes if valid where performed and in the absence of
proof that . . . their intended residence regarded the cohabitation of such persons therein
as criminal” and noting that Pennsylvania law had apparently changed again since In
re G--- was decided); In re G---, 6 I. & N. Dec. 337, 338-39 (B.I.A. 1954) (refusing to rec-
ognize a valid Italian marriage because it would be both invalid and subject to criminal
prosecution in Pennsylvania, according to information submitted after In re C--- was
decided); In re C---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 632, 633, 638 (B.I.A. 1952) (recognizing the Rhode Island
marriage of an uncle and niece since Pennsylvania, their state of residence, does not
regard their cohabitation as criminal); In re M---, 3 I.& N. Dec. 465, 465, 467 (B.I.A.
1948) (recognizing Italian marriage of uncle and niece when the couple’s cohabitation
“would not subject them to criminal prosecution” in Illinois).
155. In re E---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 239, 239-40 (B.I.A. 1951) (relying on a letter from the
deputy attorney general of the State of California stating that the parties would not be
prosecuted for violation of the California statute in order to recognize the Portuguese
uncle-niece marriage of a California domiciliary).
156. In re Balodis, 17 I. & N. Dec. 428, 429 (B.I.A. 1980) (distinguishing In re Zappia
because Michigan had no statute prohibiting evasion of its marriage law); In re Da Silva,
15 I. & N. Dec. 778, 779-80 (B.I.A. 1976) (distinguishing In re Zappia in order to recog-
nize a Georgia uncle-niece marriage, because — unlike Wisconsin in that case — New
York did not expressly declare incestuous a marriage between state residents contracted
in another state for the purpose of evading statutory prohibitions); In re Zappia, 12 I. & N.
Dec. 439, 442 (B.I.A. 1967) (refusing to recognize the valid South Carolina marriage of first
cousins because they traveled to South Carolina for the purpose of evading Wisconsin’s
statutory prohibitions of both first-cousin marriages and the evasion of this marriage law);
Hirabayashi, 10 I. & N. Dec. at 723-24 (citing 1933 Attorney General Opinion, supra
note 34) (finding a marriage valid when the couple did not go to Colorado, where they
married, “with the primary intention of evading the Illinois statutes prohibiting marriage
of cousins”); In re M---, 3 I. & N. 465, 465, 467 (B.I.A. 1948) (finding a first-cousin marriage
valid when the couple did not leave their domicile in Illinois solely for the purpose of
marrying elsewhere to evade the state’s marriage law and then returning immediately).
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couple’s cohabitation in their state of residence and could have been
decided solely on that basis.157
Lesser legislative expressions of disapproval, such as general
statutes regarding the invalidity of marriages between uncles and
nieces or cousins, have not sufficed to demonstrate a state public
policy strong enough to overcome the general presumption in favor
of recognizing marriages that were valid where celebrated. In In re
Hirabayashi, the BIA even found too weak an expression of public
policy in a statute declaring that the marriage between first cousins
would be both prohibited in Illinois and void if contracted in another
state, absent a criminal law prohibiting the couple’s cohabitation in
Illinois.158
It is particularly interesting to note the extent to which federal
authorities defer to states in these cases. The BIA changed its opinion
about a foreign uncle-niece marriage in Pennsylvania between In re
C--- (1952) and In re G--- (1954) because of additional evidence it
received from the Governor and Attorney General of Pennsylvania
prior to the second case regarding probable prosecution under the
law of Pennsylvania.159 In In re E---, the BIA even reconsidered and
changed its own prior opinion in the same case in light of the subse-
quent opinion of the Office of the Attorney General of the State of
California that an uncle and niece would not be prosecuted under
California’s criminal incest law, even though they could be.160
In general, it appears that marriages of uncles, nieces and cous-
ins, valid where celebrated, will be recognized for U.S. immigration
purposes, so long as two conditions are fulfilled: the couple’s state of
domicile, or intended domicile, does not criminally prosecute such
couples for cohabitating, and the couple did not purposefully evade
the law of its state of domicile in violation of a specific evasion statute.
3. Age-of-Consent Requirements
Unlike biracial marriages and the marriages of close relatives,
marriages that some states find invalid or criminal on the basis of a
spouse’s age may become less objectionable over time. This has caused
immigration officials and courts to focus more on specific aspects of
the law of the place of celebration and very little on the state of domi-
cile. As with biracial and consanguineous marriages, there has been
no discussion at all of federal public policy or a federal definition of
marriage in this context.
157. In re Zappia, 12 I. & N. Dec. at 439-40, 442.
158. 10 I. & N. Dec. at 722, 724.
159. In re G---, 6 I. & N. Dec. at 340-41.
160. 4 I. & N. Dec. 239, 240 (B.I.A. 1951).
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Like other marriages, marriages challenged due to the age of
one or both of the purported spouses are first examined for validity
in the state or country where they were celebrated. For instance, in
one early case, Toshiko Inaba v. Nagle, the Ninth Circuit held that
the law of Japan controlled the issue of whether an eighteen-year-
old U.S. citizen’s marriage to a Japanese man was valid, thereby
triggering racist immigration laws on the books in 1929 and causing
her to lose her U.S. citizenship.161
One consideration that is emphasized in age-of-consent cases,
but not in cases involving other types of marriage, is the distinction
between a marriage that was void ab initio and one that was merely
voidable upon renunciation or the occurrence of some other event.162
This unique emphasis is possibly because age-of-consent problems
grow less troubling as time passes and spouses grow older.
In analyzing the marriage of a minor, the BIA focuses on the law
of the state or foreign country where the marriage was celebrated.
For instance, in In re Agoudemos, the Board held that a girl’s mar-
riage was valid for immigration purposes even though she was under
sixteen, the age of consent for females in both the state of celebration
(Indiana) and the couple’s state of domicile (Wisconsin).163 In that
case, the BIA found it significant that the marriage was “voidable and
not void” under both Indiana and Wisconsin state law.164 The mar-
riage was valid for immigration purposes, since it was valid under
state law as long as the girl did not fail to ratify it when she reached
the age of majority.165
Perhaps due to the amelioration of age-of-consent concerns
as time passes, research reveals no case in which such a marriage
was valid where celebrated, but not valid for immigration purposes.
Presumably, like in other areas, a marriage that was validly cele-
brated could be challenged for immigration purposes based on the
strongly held public policy of the couple’s state of domicile against
the marriage of a minor, such as an applicable statutory rape law.
The BIA has not spoken clearly on this issue.166 Given the practical
161. Toshiko Inaba v. Nagle, 36 F.2d 481, 481-82 (1929); see also In re A---, 13 I. & N. Dec.
824, 824-25 (B.I.A. 1971) (focusing on the law of Michigan, the place of marriage celebration,
to find the marriage of a fifteen-year-old Jordanian girl valid with parental permission).
162. To see this distinction drawn more clearly, see infra notes 163-165 and accom-
panying text.
163. 10 I. & N. Dec. 444, 445-46 (B.I.A. 1964).
164. Id. at 446.
165. Id. at 447; see also In re G---, 9 I. & N. Dec. 89, 89-91 (B.I.A. 1960) (focusing solely
on Illinois state law, which classified marriage of minor as voidable, not void ab initio,
to find her marriage valid for immigration purposes despite her ability to disavow the
relationship upon reaching the age of consent).
166. In In re Agoudemos, the BIA considered both the law of the state of celebration
and the state of domicile when determining marital validity; however, this may have been
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timing considerations in these cases, it is also unlikely to do so in the
future.
4. Marriage Involving a Transgender Spouse
U.S. immigration authorities were initially more stymied by the
subject of marriage for transgender persons than any subject since
the nonsensical, yet cruel, pre-1952 requirement that limited the
acquisition of U.S. citizenship to only “free white persons, and to
aliens of African nativity.”167
In re Lovo-Lara, the only reported BIA opinion specifically assess-
ing the validity of a marriage involving a transgender spouse, was
an example of overkill, since it does not indicate what would have occurred if the laws
of those states had been significantly different. 10 I. & N. Dec. at 446. The other case that
appears to focus on the law of a couple’s intended state of domicile is In re Manjoukis,
13 I. & N. Dec. 705 (B.I.A. 1971). In that case, the BIA focused on whether the marriage
of a fourteen-year-old female would be valid under the state law of Michigan, the state
where the U.S. citizen resided. Id. at 705-06. This case, however, involved a fiancé visa
petition, not an already married couple. There was not yet a “place of celebration” and
a K-1 visa required the couple to marry in the United States within ninety days of the
fiancé’s admission. Id. at 705. The Board logically focused on the law of Michigan, the state
where the couple would presumably marry and reside once the fiancé was admitted into
the United States. Id. at 706. In this case, the Board ordered denial of the fiancé visa, since
the marriage would be void ab intio, rather than merely voidable, in Michigan. Id.
167. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178, 190 (1922). The BIA, federal circuit courts,
and even the United States Supreme Court resorted to semi-fictionalized “scientific,” his-
torical, and social understandings of race during the first half of the twentieth century as
they wrestled with the question of what it meant to be a “white person” as required to
qualify to become a U.S. citizen and whether persons of the Japanese, Arabian, Hindu,
Parsee, and Tartar “races” qualified. See, e.g., United States v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206,
208-10 (1923) (finding that in spite of the fact that his “stock” is Caucasian, a “high caste
Hindu of full Indian blood” is not a “white person” according to “common understanding,”
apparently because of Indians’ physical characteristics such as skin color); Ozawa, 260
U.S. at 192, 197-98 (discussing the history of racist naturalization requirements dating
back to 1790 and discussing the intent of the framers in support of its holding that a
Japanese man was not a “white person” even if his skin is white since “to adopt the color
test alone would result in a confused overlapping of races and a gradual merging of one
into the other, without any practical line of separation”; the Court instead limited the
definition of “white person” to “the Caucasian race”); United States v. Balsara, 180 F.
694, 695, 695-97, aff’g 171 F. 294 (2d Cir. 1939) (holding that a Parsee of a race which
immigrated from Persia to India “some 1,200 years ago” is not a “white person”); In re S---,
4 I.& N. Dec. 104, 104, 105, 106, 106 n.2 (B.I.A. 1950) (finding that “Tartars of eastern
Russian in the Ufa area are members of the white or so-called European race, in spite
of their Asiatic origin[, t]he test . . . [being] the racial composition evaluated at the
present time . . . [rather than] the origin of the applicant’s racial strain,” and citing In
re K---, 2 I. & N. Dec. 253, 256 (B.I.A. 1945; A.G. 1945), for the proposition that Afghans
are a “European race . . . [even though] some Afghans hav[e] some Mongoloid and Indian
strains”); In re S---, 1 I.& N. Dec. 174, 174, 178 (B.I.A. 1941) (finding that an Iraqi citizen,
whose parents were “full-blooded Arabians” of “Turkish stock,” was a “white person,” as
distinguished from Parsees from Persia and “Hindus” and the other “teeming millions” of
“Far East Asiatics” who do not qualify as “white”; “[t]he line has apparently been drawn
at the Afghans” who are not “white”).
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decided in 2005.168 This is not surprising, since U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) issued two different illogical policy
memoranda in 2003 and 2004, causing confusion and hardship for
couples before the BIA finally clarified the issue.
First, in 2003, USCIS purported to defer to congressional silence
with regard to the meaning of the terms “man” and “woman” under
DOMA, ruling that one’s sex at birth determines his or her sex for
life under U.S. immigration law.169 The agency apparently assumed
that all transgender people are homosexual as viewed from the sex
on their birth certificates; for example, that all male-to-female trans-
gender women are sexually attracted to men. This assumption is not
accurate.170
Apparently discovering that its bright-line “birth sex” rule could
force it to recognize marriages between couples that are physically
and legally of the same sex, USCIS appeared to throw its hands up
in the air and declare that it would not recognize the ability of a
transsexual to marry anyone. Its attempt at clarification declared
that USCIS “shall not recognize the marriage . . . between two indi-
viduals where one or both of the parties claims to be a transsexual,
regardless of whether either individual has undergone sex reassign-
ment surgery.”171
In May 2005, the BIA stepped in to correct the USCIS. In In re
Lovo-Lara, it issued a well-reasoned precedential decision recogniz-
ing the validity of a marriage between a transsexual woman and a
foreign-born man when North Carolina, the state in which the mar-
riage occurred, had previously issued a new birth certificate reflecting
168. 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 747 (B.I.A. 2005).
169. Nicole Lawrence Ezer, The Intersection of Immigration Law and Family Law, 40
FAM. L.Q. 339, 346 (2006) (“The 2003 Yates Memo stated that the service considers fed-
eral law to be controlling on this point, and without direct legislation from the Congress,
the Service ‘has no legal basis on which to recognize change of sex so that a marriage
between two persons born of the same sex can be recognized.’ ” (quoting Memorandum
from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. of Operations, U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Serv.,
Spousal Immigrant Visa Petitions AD 02-16 (Mar. 20, 2003)).
170. Gender identity and sexual attraction are distinct concepts. While most trans-
gender people, like their non-transgender counterparts, identify as heterosexual, many
identify as gay or lesbian after their transition. For instance, a male-to-female transsexual
may be attracted to other women. According to the reasoning of the 2003 Memorandum,
after she transitioned and legally changed her sex to female, USCIS would recognize her
marriage to a woman, but not a man, under DOMA. The BIA noted the “anomalous
results” of this USCIS position in its opinion in In re Lovo-Lara. 23 I. & N. Dec. at 753 n.5.
171.  Memorandum from William R. Yates, Assoc. Dir. of Operations, U.S. Citizenship
& Immigration Serv., Adjudications of and Petitions Filed by or on Behalf of, or Document
Requests by, Transsexual Individuals HQOPRD 70/6 (Apr. 16, 2004), available at http://
www.ilw.com/articles/2004,0817-mehta1.pdf; see also USCIS Instructs on Petitions, Appli-
cations Filed by or on Behalf of Transsexuals, 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES 929 (July 19,
2004) (discussing the content of the 2004 memorandum).
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her female gender and considered the relationship to be a valid hetero-
sexual marriage.172 The BIA found that:
There is also nothing in the legislative history [of DOMA] to indi-
cate that, other than in the limited area of same-sex marriages,
Congress sought to overrule our long-standing case law holding
that there is no Federal definition of marriage and that the valid-
ity of a particular marriage is determined by the law of the State
where the marriage was celebrated. While we recognize, of course,
that the ultimate issue of the validity of a marriage for immigra-
tion purposes is one of Federal law, that law has, from the incep-
tion of our nation, recognized that the regulation of marriage is
almost exclusively a State matter.173
The Board then pointed to the legislative history of DOMA, which
focused solely on “homosexual marriage” and explained that the fed-
eral definition section is meant simply to proscribe recognition of those
marriages.174 The Board quoted the House Report on DOMA, which
explained that “[o]ther than this narrow federal requirement, the
federal government will continue to determine marital status in the
same manner it does under current law.”175 The BIA added that it
was persuaded that Congress did not mean to address opposite-sex
marriages involving transgender spouses through its silence on this
issue, pointing out that at least one state court decision had previ-
ously recognized the validity of such marriages.176 In the end, In re
Lovo-Lara held valid the marriages of transgender individuals who
wed within jurisdictions that give legal effect to sex reassignments
and recognize the marriages as heterosexual.177
While very helpful, In re Lovo-Lara does leave several unresolved
issues regarding the recognition of transgender spouses.178 For ex-
ample, by requiring that the state recognize a transgender person’s
relationship as a “heterosexual marriage,” the Board raises a difficult
question when it is overlaid upon the marriage laws of the growing
172. In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 746-47.
173. Id. at 751 (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 749-51.
175. Id. at 751-52 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 31 (1996)) (emphasis in original).
176. Id. at 749-50 (referring to M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1976)).
177. Id. at 751.
178. This article briefly addresses two of these outstanding issues: (1) what constitutes
a “heterosexual marriage” in a state that does not discriminate against same-sex couples,
and (2) what does “postoperative” mean? There are, however, a number of others, such
as: What if the transition occurs after marriage? What if a court recognizes the gender
change but the transgender person cannot obtain an amended birth certificate?
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number of states that do not discriminate between “heterosexual mar-
riages” and other marriages. Namely, how will immigration officials
know whether such a state views a given marriage as “heterosexual”?
Although the BIA’s conclusion in In re Lovo-Lara focuses on the
traditional deference to states in determining the issue of marriage,
the Board noted repeatedly that the petitioning transgender spouse
in In re Lovo-Lara was “postoperative.”179 In amending its Adjudi-
cator’s Field Manual (AFM) in January 2009, the USCIS focused
on this fact and made “sex reassignment surgery” a prerequisite for
recognizing a transgender person’s corrected sex.180 Perhaps this was
a characteristic attempt to simplify the question for immigration
examiners with yet another bright-line federal test. The terms “sex
reassignment surgery” and “postoperative,” however, are neither
simple nor unambiguous.181 In fact, this ambiguity has already led to
multiple BIA appeals and remands in at least one unreported case
in which the USCIS eventually recognized the marriage of a woman
to a transsexual man who had a mastectomy but no genital surgery.182
While In re Lovo-Lara is the only officially reported BIA case
regarding the marriages of transgender individuals, the Board has
been consistent in its approach, employing similar analysis in un-
reported cases before and after In re Lovo-Lara was published.183
179. In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 747, 749-51.
180. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD MANUAL § 21.3(a)
(2)(J) (2009) (redacted public version) [hereinafter 2009 FIELD MANUAL], available at
http://www.uscis.gov (follow “Laws” hyperlink; then follow “Immigration Handbooks,
Manuals, and Policy Guidance” hyperlink on left side of page; then follow “Adjudicator’s
Field Manual” hyperlink; then follow “21.3” hyperlink).
181. Sexual transition is a complex process that can involve different procedures ranging
from hormone therapy to various types of surgical procedures. See, e.g., Kristin Schilt &
Matthew Wiswall, Before and After: Gender Transitions, Human Capital, and Workplace
Experiences, 8 BERKELEY ELECTRONIC J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y art. 39, *6 (2008).
“Gender reassignment surgery,” therefore, may imply genital surgery, but it is not the
only clear meaning of “postoperative” in this context.
182. In re Oren, No. A79-761-848, 2004 WL 1167318 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2004), rev’d,
No. A79-761-848, 2006 WL 448282 (B.I.A. Jan 25, 2006); see also VICTORIA NEILSON
& KRISTINA WERTZ, IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE TRANSGENDER CLIENT § 4.5.2 (2009),
available at http://www.immigrationequality.org/template3.php?pageid=1135 (discussing
In re Oren).
183. See, e.g., In re P.B., No. A087-002-967, 2009 WL 523126 (B.I.A. Feb. 18, 2009)
(remanding the case for fact finding regarding inter alia proof the marriage was recognized
as a valid heterosexual union in Nevada where it was celebrated, but oddly remaining
silent regarding the law of the couple’s state of domicile, or intended domicile); In re
Ahmad, No. A96-609-556, 2007 WL 3301748 (B.I.A. Sept. 26, 2007) (following In re Lovo-
Lara to recognize the marriage of a man and a postoperative male-to-female transsexual
as a “heterosexual marriage” under the laws of the state of New York although his wife
could not produce a revised birth certificate from Singapore); In re Widener, No. A95-
347-685, 2004 WL 2375065 (B.I.A. Sept. 21, 2004) (restating the traditional general rule
of universal recognition for marriages that are valid where celebrated, while finding that
there is no strongly held federal public policy regarding the marriage of a postoperative
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Together, In re Lovo-Lara and its progeny reiterate the continuing
focus on state laws in determining whether a couple is, in fact, mar-
ried (or opposite sex) for immigration purposes. The Board clearly
does not buy the argument that Congress intended to silently create
new federal definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” in the INA as the
Ninth Circuit assumed in Adams v. Howerton.184 It is no more likely
that the common meaning of “marriage” or the specific intent of
Congress included transsexual spouses than same-sex spouses when
those terms were used in the INA.185
C. Federal Public Policy Exceptions to Marriage Recognition
Under the INA
Although immigration officials and courts have generally looked
to state law to define marriage for immigration purposes, they also
agree that Congress has the power to override that state definition as
it is used in the federal INA. With the exception of the Ninth Circuit
decisions Adams v. Howerton and Kahn v. INS, immigration officials
and courts have uniformly understood Congress’s intent to use the
terms “marriage” and “spouse” as defined by state law, unless an
exception is clearly warranted based on relevant, express statutory
language, or unless the marriage was entered solely for the purpose
of committing immigration fraud.186
This subsection focuses on the rare, recognized exceptions to
marriage recognition under the INA, based on strongly held specific
federal public policy. These federal public policy exceptions are cur-
rently limited to four categories: “marriage fraud,”187 unconsummated
male-to-female transsexual since DOMA and INA are both silent on this issue); Oren, 2004
WL 1167318 (restating the traditional rules regarding marital recognition under the INA
before remanding the case for factual findings regarding the sex and marriage under
Oregon state law of the petitioner, a female to male transsexual who had not undergone
genital surgery).
184. 673 F.2d 1036, 1040 (9th Cir. 1982).
185. In re Lovo-Lara relied, in part, on the fact that a reported case recognized a
transgendered spouse’s marriage under the law of at least one state at the time when
DOMA was enacted. In re Lovo-Lara, 23 I. & N. Dec. 746, 749-50 (B.I.A. 2005) (citing M.T.
v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204, 211 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976)). However, it is highly unlikely
that Congress intended to specifically recognize marriages involving transgender spouses
when it enacted the INA any more than it intended to recognize same-sex marriages. As
the In re Lovo-Lara decision recognizes, congressional silence often really means silence,
not some hidden positive regulatory agenda. Id. at 750. Its footnote distinguishing Adams
v. Howerton does not comment one way or the other on the correctness of that decision.
Id. at 752 n.4.
186. See supra Part II (laying out the test for marriage validity under the INA and
exceptions to marriage validity).
187. The requirement of marital bona fides can be conceptualized as either a federal
public policy exception to marriage recognition under the INA or a limit to the definition
of the terms “marriage” and “spouse” as demonstrated by Congress in the INA.
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proxy marriage, polygamy, and same sex marriage. All four cate-
gories can be justified by express statutory language either specifi-
cally delineating the exception (proxy marriage and marriage fraud)
or establishing a ban to U.S. admission for those who participate in
the specified relationship (polygamy and, originally, homosexuality).
Today, the ban on homosexual admissibility has been repealed, but
DOMA expressly demonstrates the continuing federal public policy
against recognition of same-sex marriage.
1. A Note on “Marriage Fraud” and Federal Public Policy
As described above, marital bona fides is the subject of the third
step in the practice-oriented three-step test of marriage validity for
U.S. immigration purposes. Conceptually, this test can also be viewed
as one of the exceptions to the rule of marriage recognition based on
strongly held federal public policy.188 This exception is clearly sup-
ported by express language throughout the INA. The INA expressly
sets out marriage bona fides as an evidentiary requirement for condi-
tional permanent residence.189 It also provides for deportation on the
basis of “marriage fraud,”190 and it criminalizes “knowingly enter[ing]
into a marriage for the purpose of evading any provision of the immi-
gration laws” with possible prison sentences of up to five years.191
Since marriage is the easiest way to obtain many immigration
benefits, and the only way to obtain some, immigration officials right-
fully fear that foreign nationals will abuse the U.S. immigration
system by contracting “sham marriages,” marriages entered into for
the primary purpose of procuring a benefit under U.S. immigration
law.192 Therefore, they police the legitimacy of marital relations very
188. See supra note 47 and accompanying text (discussing congressional intent to not
recognize “sham” marriages).
189. Immigration and Nationality Act § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(III), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)(A)
(i)(III) (2006).
190. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G) (expressly
identifying marriage fraud as a basis for deportation).
191. Immigration and Nationality Act § 275(c), 8 U.S.C. § 1325(c) (prescribing im-
prisonment of up to five years and fines of up to $250,000 for the crime of marriage fraud).
In Lutwak v. United States, the United States Supreme Court upheld this federal refusal
to recognize otherwise legally valid marriages. 344 U.S. 604, 608-13 (1953). Three
justices, however, were unwilling to recognize even this departure from the idea that
marriage validity is determined on the basis of the law of the place where it was
celebrated. Id. at 620-21 (Jackson, J., Black, J., & Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
192. There are a plethora of cases in which foreign nationals paid U.S. citizens to marry
them so that they could secure immigration benefits. See, e.g., Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 609-
10 (refusing to recognize the validity of three “spurious phony marriages” contracted in
France); Garcia-Jaramillo v. INS, 604 F.2d 1236, 1238 (9th Cir. 1979) (deciding a case
in which a foreign national allegedly gave a U.S. citizen $200 to marry him); Volianitis
v. INS, 352 F.2d 766, 767 (9th Cir. 1965) (deciding a case in which a foreign national
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strictly.193 In fact, determining whether to recognize a marriage as
bona fide is the overwhelming practical concern of most U.S. immi-
gration examiners.194
Immigration officials have developed elaborate matrices of
factual inquiry for substantiating the legitimacy of a legally valid
marriage.195 There are also express provisions in the INA for a re-
buttable presumption of fraud when a new marriage is terminated
within two years of the foreign national spouse becoming a lawful per-
manent resident196 or when the marriage is entered while removal
proceedings are pending.197 The United States Supreme Court has
upheld this refusal to recognize otherwise perfectly valid marriages
under the INA on the basis that they were contracted solely for the
purpose of obtaining immigration benefits.198
apparently paid a U.S. citizen $250 cash so she would marry him “in name only” so he
could remain in the United States).
While immigration officials are willing to delve into the very personal details of a
couple’s life together, they are supposedly only looking to ascertain that the couple did
not marry primarily for the purpose of immigration. The author’s personal experience leads
him to believe that immigration examiners are applying their own subjective standards
of what determines a bona fide marriage. However, the published cases indicate that
immigration law is not concerned with the conformity of a legal marriage arrangement
to societal expectations. See, e.g., In re Peterson, 12 I. & N. Dec. 663, 665 (B.I.A. 1968)
(finding that consummation is not required for a bona fide marriage based largely on
housekeeping duties).
193. Fraudulent Marriage and Fiancé Arrangements to Obtain Permanent Resident
Immigration Status: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Pol’y of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 99th Cong. 18 (1985) (statement of Alan C. Nelson,
Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Service).
194. It is important to note that this bona fides requirement is apparently based solely
on the prevention of marriages fraudulently entered for the purpose of obtaining immi-
gration benefits. It is clear from the case law that the requirement is not based on the
desire to ensure that foreign nationals allowed to immigrate on the basis of marriage are
actually remaining in the United States with their spouses. See Whether Present Viability
of a Marriage is a Factor in Adjudicating an I-751, Op. INS Gen. Couns. No. 91-7 (Jan. 25,
1991) (advising that an application to remove the conditional nature of a temporary lawful
permanent residence status does not depend on the continuing viability of a marriage
that was not entered for fraudulent reasons).
195. This includes photos of a wedding, vacations, anniversaries, or other marriage
highlights; evidence of a common residence; affidavits of family and friends; love letters
and gifts; evidence of children from the marriage; evidence of financial gifts or support;
and financial interconnection in the form of joint bank accounts, joint credit cards, joint
lease agreements, joint ownership of real property, automobiles or other personal property.
See 8 C.F.R. § 1216.4(a)(5) (2009) (providing some examples of marriage documentation).
The USCIS looks for triggers that indicate the possibility of a sham marriage, including:
a large age disparity; language incompatibility; “[v]ast difference in cultural and ethnic
background”; use of a matchmaker; “[d]iscrepancies in statements on questions for which
a husband and wife should have common knowledge”; “[n]o cohabitation”; and family
friends. 2009 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 180, at § 21.3(a)(2)(H).
196. Immigration and Nationality Act § 237(a)(1)(G)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(G)(i).
197. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(e)(1)-(2), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(1)-(2).
198. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 611-13 (1953).
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The category of marriage involved is not relevant to this exami-
nation of marital bona fides. The existence of an otherwise legally
valid marriage must normally be proven before an immigration ex-
aminer evaluates whether a marriage is a “sham” for immigration
purposes.199 Starting with that documented, lawful marriage, immi-
gration officials examine the intent of the legal spouses and the nature
of their relationship, often in intrusive detail that state and federal
officials would not attempt outside of the immigration context.200
In addition to “sham marriages,” immigration authorities and
courts have carved out three categories of marriage that are not rec-
ognized for immigration purposes on the basis of an expressly stated
federal public policy: unconsummated proxy marriages, polygamous
marriages, and same-sex marriages. The rest of this section examines
these decisions and the next section explains why same-sex marriages
should no longer fall within the federal public policy exception if
DOMA is repealed or struck down.
2. Proxy Marriage
The INA does not define the word “marriage”; however, it does
expressly state that it will not recognize “any marriage ceremony
where the contracting parties thereto are not physically present in
the presence of each other, unless the marriage shall have been con-
summated.” 201 This clear statement of the federal public policy of
ignoring unconsummated proxy marriages for immigration purposes
has been around since the Immigration Act of 1924.202
Prior to the express provision of the Immigration Act of 1924 deal-
ing with proxy marriages, these marriages were treated like biracial
199. See supra Part II.A for a description of a three-part test for marriage validity
under the INA.
200. Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation Policy, 99
HARV. L. REV. 1238, 1245-46 (1986).
201. Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(35), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35); see also In
re B---, 5 I. & N. Dec. 698, 699 (B.I.A. 1954) (finding that a relationship did not qualify
under this provision even though it had been consummated prior to the marriage, if it
had not been consummated afterwards); Effect of Proxy Marriage on Entry as Unmarried
Child, Op. INS Gen. Couns. No. 91-20 (Feb. 15, 1991) (finding it appropriate to enter the
United States under the category for the unmarried children of a fourth preference alien,
since her prior, unconsummated proxy marriage was invalid for immigration purposes).
202. See Silva v. Tillinghast, 36 F.2d 801, 802 (D. Mass. 1929) (describing the prohibition
of proxy marriage in the Immigration Act of 1924, but finding an error in the Immigration
Tribunal’s reevaluating this issue that had already been decided by the Department of
State in its decision to issue an immigrant visa); In re W---, 4 I. & N. Dec. 209, 210 (B.I.A.
1950) (finding that a valid Italian proxy marriage was not recognized by specific provision
of the Immigration Act of 1924, but foreign-born child of that marriage was legitimate
for immigration purposes).
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marriages, uncle-niece and cousin marriages, and others.203 Namely,
the BIA focused on the law of the place where the marriage was cele-
brated and the law of the spouses’ domicile, or planned domicile, in
order to determine whether a marriage was valid under U.S. immi-
gration law. Proxy marriages were recognized under pre-1924 immi-
gration law as long as they were valid where celebrated and as long
as the state of domicile did not expressly disqualify foreign proxy
marriages.204 Even today, in cases where a proxy marriage was later
consummated, U.S. immigration authorities look to state law in order
to determine its validity.205
3. Polygamy
In addition to unconsummated proxy marriages, federal courts
and the BIA agree that polygamous marriages generally are not
valid for immigration purposes as a matter of federal public policy.
Of course, this is not surprising: U.S. immigration statutes have
expressly prohibited the admission of “polygamists” into the United
States since the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1891.206 Courts
203. The legal recognition of proxy marriages had apparently been of little practical
significance from 1711 until World War I; however, the long absence of soldiers from home
during that conflict apparently caused a number of jurisdictions and the U.S. Judge
Advocate General to favorably discuss the possibility of valid proxy marriages. See Ernest
G. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HARV. L. REV. 473, 473, 487-
88 (1919) (describing this history and arguing that proxy marriages should be recognized
in any U.S. states that still recognized common law marriages); see also United States
ex rel. Aznar v. Comm’r of Immigration at Port of N.Y., 298 F. 103, 105 (S.D.N.Y. 1924)
(citing opinion of Judge Advocate General).
204. Consulich Societa Triestina di Navigazione v. Elting, 66 F.2d 534, 536 (2d Cir.
1933) (remanding because spouse failed to establish that marriage was valid where
celebrated); Kane v. Johnson, 13 F.2d 432, 432 (D. Mass. 1926) (apparently relying on
Ex parte Suzanna in order to recognize a valid Portuguese proxy marriage because
Massachusetts would not prohibit its domiciliaries from marrying by proxy in another
jurisdiction); United States ex rel. Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927, 927-29 (E.D. La. 1925)
(recognizing a valid Turkish proxy marriage in spite of Louisiana’s prohibition of marriages
by procuration, because state policy did not expressly prohibit the recognition of such
marriages celebrated in another jurisdiction); Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F. 713, 717 (D. Mass.
1924) (recognizing a valid Portuguese proxy marriage for immigration purposes because
it would have been recognized under the law of Pennsylvania); Aznar, 298 F. at 103, 106
(purportedly relying on United States ex rel. Markarian v. Tod, 290 F. 198 (9th Cir.
1961), to recognize a valid Spanish proxy marriage despite apparent confusion).
205. See, e.g., Marriage by Proxy, Op. INS Gen. Couns. No. 93-73 (Sept. 21, 1993) (look-
ing solely to the law of the District of Columbia, where a proxy marriage was purportedly
celebrated, in order to find that the marriage was not valid for immigration purposes; of
course, in light of the definition of marriage in INA § 101(a)(35), such a proxy marriage
must also be consummated).
206. Immigration Act of 1891, 26 Stat. 570 (1891). Today, under Immigration and
Nationality Act § 212(a)(10)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(10)(A) (2006), “[a]ny immigrant who
is coming to the United States to practice polygamy is inadmissible.”
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and the BIA have understood this inadmissibility provision as a state-
ment of clear federal public policy that prevents recognition of polyga-
mous marriages for immigration purposes.207 A different construction
of “marriage” under the INA would result in internal inconsistency
within the Act. Based on this understanding, the USCIS requires
applicants for marriage-based immigration benefits to provide proof
of the legal termination of any prior marriages of either spouse.208
In the 1927 case of Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, the Ninth Circuit re-
fused to recognize a valid Chinese polygamous marriage for U.S. im-
migration purposes.209 The court recognized the general rule that a
marriage, valid where celebrated, will be valid everywhere.210 It also
described “[a]n exception to the general rule . . . in the case of mar-
riages repugnant to the public policy of the domicile of the parties, in
respect of polygamy, incest, or miscegenation, or otherwise contrary
to its positive laws.” 211
The Ninth Circuit did not specify whether it was referring to the
policy of the state or country of domicile in Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin.
Failure to cite the polygamy ground of inadmissibility might imply
that the court was referring to state law.212 The court in Weedin also
assumed the universality and natural law foundation of its position
when it quoted another section of C.J.S. for the proposition that “[i]t
is implied in the conception of marriage in all Christian countries that
the relation can exist only between one man and one woman, a polyga-
mous or polyandrous union being under the law no marriage.” 213
The BIA later anchored its understanding of Ng Suey Hi v.
Weedin and the “polygamy” exception to the rule of recognition clearly
in positivist terms. In In re H---, the Board explained that this U.S.
public policy “against polygamists and polygamy” was expressed in
the INA provision proscribing the admissibility of polygamists.214 As
207. Ng Suey Hi v. Weedin, 21 F.2d 801, 801-02 (9th Cir. 1927); In re Darwish, 14 I.
& N. Dec. 307, 308-09 (B.I.A. 1973); In re H---, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640, 641 (B.I.A. 1962).
208. 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(a)(2) (2009).
209. 21 F.2d at 801-02.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 802. It is important to distinguish this idea of a universal definition of
marriage in Christian countries from the sort of focus on congressional intent that was
discussed in later cases such as Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982).
212. The court likely saw this ambiguity as irrelevant since it would have understood
that there was agreement on this subject among all U.S. jurisdictions.
213. Ng Suey Hi, 21 F.2d at 802 (quoting Corpus Juris Secundum, currently included
at 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 2 (2009)).
214. 9 I. & N. Dec. 640, 641, 642 (B.I.A. 1962) (finding a valid Jordanian polygamous
marriage invalid for immigration purposes as “repugnant to [United States] public policy”).
The BIA may have felt forced to make this specific immigration law distinction in light of
information that “[t]here have been exceptions from the nonrecognition of polygamous
marriages, such as American Indian tribal marriages, which have been upheld in the
absence of a federal statute rendering such tribal laws and customs invalid.” Id. at 642
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the Board explained in another case, “Congress did not intend to
accord preference status on the basis of [polygamous] relationships
in view of the clear disfavor it expressed towards polygamy by exclud-
ing polygamists from entry into the United States under” the INA.215
As straightforward as the bar on “polygamists and polygamy” may
seem, even it has not always led to a clear and universal refusal to
ever recognize polygamous marriages for immigration purposes. In
at least one case, the B.I.A. found that a woman was not a polygamist
merely because she was married to two men at the same time.216 The
Board explained in In re G--- that “ ‘bigamy’ and ‘polygamy’ are neither
synonymous nor interchangeable,” not because polygamy might indi-
cate that someone has more than one spouse, but apparently because
“bigamists” are not Mormons.217 The Board further explained that,
“[a]ccording to the legislative history of the 1917 [immigration] act,
the words ‘polygamists’ and ‘polygamy’ refer to the historical custom
and religious practice, which the Mormons had typified in this coun-
try until the statutory abolition of polygamy in the latter part of the
[nineteenth] century.” 218 In spite of this questionable rationalization,
the Board seemed to be grasping to apply the spirit of the law by rec-
ognizing an extra-legal separation as a divorce. Of course, it might not
have hurt that this case involved a woman with two living husbands
rather than a man with two wives.
In 1993, the INS General Counsel’s Office determined that a
Senegalese man with two wives in Senegal was no longer excludable
from the United States, since the INA was amended in 1990 to exclude
only “immigrant[s] coming to the United States to practice polygamy”
rather than anyone “practic[ing] polygamy or advocat[ing] the prac-
tice of polygamy” as had the prior law.219 In addition, it determined
that he would not be practicing polygamy in the United States “if his
application for admission also requested the admission of one of his
wives. The presumption is that any other wife or wives would remain
outside of the United States.” 220
(citing GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 370, 373 (3d ed., 1949)) (emphasis in In re H---); see
also In re Darwish, 14 I. & N. Dec. 307, 308 (B.I.A. 1973) (refusing to recognize the valid-
ity of a Jordanian-Muslim plural marriage because it “offend[s] the public policy of the
United States”).
215. In re Man, 16 I. & N. Dec. 543, 543, 544 (B.I.A. 1978) (dealing with polygamy in
the context of the purported “stepmother” relationship of a Chinese polygamous second
wife and her husband’s child by his first wife).
216. In re G---, 6 I. & N. Dec. 9, 11 (B.I.A. 1953).
217. Id. at 11 & n.5.
218. Id. at 10-11 (citations omitted).
219. Polygamy in Senegal, Op. INS Gen. Couns. No. 93-98 (Dec. 29, 1993).
220. Id. Of course, not everyone would share the idea of marriage and polygamy implicit
in the General Counsel Opinion, i.e., that one is only married during the time when he
and his wife are cohabitating in the same jurisdiction.
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In spite of the General Counsel’s apparent determination that
a polygamous marriage can be recognized under the post-1990 INA
so long as only two opposite-sex spouses are in the United States to-
gether, research reveals no reported case in which this opinion was
followed. In fact, there have been several unreported BIA cases that
rely on a continuing understanding that polygamous marriages are
still contrary to federal public policy and therefore not recognized
for the purpose of granting marriage-based benefits under the INA,
regardless of how many spouses are actually immigrating together
to the United States.221
4. Same-Sex Marriage
The United States has a long history of overt discrimination
against lesbian, gay, and bisexual immigrants from other countries.
There was an outright bar on the admission of lesbians and gay men
into the United States until 1990.222 Although the word “homosexual”
was apparently no more “fit to be named” by Congress than by fed-
eral courts,223 homosexual men and women were excluded from the
United States throughout the twentieth century under the labels
“public charge,” “mentally defective,” “constitutional psychopathic
inferiority,” “psychopathic personality,” and “sexual deviancy,” de-
pending on the fashionable pseudoscientific term or homophobic
rationale of the day.224
221. See, e.g., In re Ali, No. A88-129-989, 2007 WL 4707517 (B.I.A. Oct. 31, 2007)
(finding that, even if a polygamous marriage were “valid in Yemen, it cannot be recog-
nized as a valid marriage for immigration purposes because there is a strong federal
public policy against polygamy in this United States”); In re Adomako, No. A99-365-109,
2006 WL 3712508 (B.I.A. Nov. 20, 2006) (refusing to recognize a Ghanian marriage for
various reasons, including the repugnance of polygamous marriage to U.S. public policy);
In re Abulrub, No. A96-750-665, 2006 WL 3485576 (B.I.A. Oct. 31, 2006) (refusing to recog-
nize a valid Yemeni polygamous marriage because of U.S. public policy, even after the
death of the husband’s first wife).
222. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 24, 28.
223. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citing
4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215).
224. Although these pseudoscientific terms were less than clear, authorities, including
the Supreme Court, found that they were not unconstitutionally vague. See Boutilier v.
INS, 387 U.S. 118, 118-23 (1967) (holding that homosexuals are excludable under the cate-
gory of “psychopathic personality,” since legislative history demonstrated that Congress
intended that phrase to exclude “homosexuals and other sex perverts,” not those whom
a professional psychiatrist would use the term to classify); see also In re Longstaff, 716
F.2d 1439, 1440 (5th Cir. 1983) (affirming a decision that a homosexual man may be denied
naturalization on grounds of “psychopathic personality”); Quiroz v. Neelly, 291 F.2d 906,
907 (5th Cir. 1961) (holding that, in light of congressional intent to exclude “homosexuals
and sex perverts,” the psychological meaning of the term “psychopathic personality” is
not controlling); United States v. Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405, 410 (2d Cir. 1956)
(concluding that a gay man could have been excluded from admission to the United States
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Throughout most of this period, Congress and the INS em-
ployed doctors with the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) to rubber
stamp the diagnosis of these pseudoscientific “afflictions.” 225 What-
ever the term, the result was generally the same: if discovered, for-
eign lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals were not allowed to enter the
United States for any reason.226
While a few judges expressed doubts about a law that would
have excluded Leonardo DaVinci, Oscar Wilde, or even William
as a person “of constitutional psychopathic inferiority”); In re Hill, 18 I .& N. Dec. 81, 84
(B.I.A. 1981), rev’d, Hill v. INS, 714 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1983) (allowing exclusion of a “self-
admitted homosexual” even though the Public Health Service refused to issue certification
that he had a “psychopathic personality”); In re Lavoie, 12 I. & N. Dec. 821, 823 (B.I.A.
1968) (finding a gay man deportable because he was a homosexual, and therefore “afflicted
with psychopathic personality” under the INA); In re Steele, 12 I. & N. Dec. 302, 302-03
(B.I.A. 1967) (citing Boutilier for the proposition that a gay man was deportable as “one
who was a constitutional psychopathic inferior” under the law in effect at the time of his
last admission into the United States in 1952); In re Lavoie, 11 I. & N. Dec. 224, 227 (B.I.A.
1965) (holding that a gay man is deportable as a “psychopathic personality” because they
are “words of art which, whatever else they might mean, include homosexuality and sex
perverts”); In re S---, 8 I. & N. Dec. 409, 412-14 (B.I.A. 1959) (describing some of the
history of the homosexual exclusion, including the idea that “a convicted and admitted
homosexual, came under the term ‘mentally defective’ ” under the 1917 Immigration Act
(citing Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d 405), while determining that a gay man was excludable
as a “ ‘psychopathic personality’ [an] individual[ ] who manifest[s] poor judgment [and] does
not follow . . . the usual moral and social code . . . although . . . he knows what he is doing
and the consequences of his acts” under the INA of 1952); In re P---, 7 I. & N. Dec. 258, 261,
263 (B.I.A. 1956) (reviewing the same legislative history to find that Congress intended
to continue excluding homosexuals when it adopted the term “afflicted with psychopathic
personality” in the INA of 1952, which “merely reflected modernized medical terminology”);
MARGOT CANADAY, THE STRAIGHT STATE 21-23 (2009) (discussing the “public charge”
ground of exclusion and its early employment against lesbians and gay men). But see Fleuti
v. Rosenberg, 302 F.2d 652, 658 (9th Cir. 1962), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
Rosenberg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963) (holding that the term “psychopathic person-
ality is void for vagueness”); Flores-Rodriguez, 237 F.2d at 412 (Frank, J., concurring)
(questioning the majority’s willingness “needlessly to embark — without a pilot, rudder,
compass or radar — on an amateur’s voyage on the fog-enshrouded sea of psychiatry”).
225. See, e.g., In re Lavoie, 11 I. & N. Dec. at 225 (PHS staff psychiatrist testified that,
although not the best diagnosis “from a psychiatric point of view . . . he was compelled
by the directives of the United States Public Health Service Manual to classify” a man
with a “history of homosexuality as a psychopathic personality”); In re P---, 7 I. & N. at
259-60 (describing a PHS doctor’s testimony that he certified that the foreign national
“was afflicted with a psychopathic personality” based on a five-minute interview); see also
Richard Green, “Give Me Your Tired, Your Poor, Your Huddled Masses” (Of Heterosexuals):
An Analysis of American and Canadian Immigration Policy, 16 ANGLO-AM. L. REV. 139,
140-44 (1987) (describing the role of the PHS in certifying homosexuals for exclusion
from the United States between 1917 and the 1980s). But see Longstaff, 716 F.2d at 1443-
44, 1451 (stating that the Attorney General determined that the PHS would no longer
declare homosexuals to be per se mentally disabled, but that Longstaff could still be
excluded based on his own admission of homosexuality); Quiroz, 291 F.2d at 907 (finding
a lesbian inadmissible as a “psychopathic personality” in spite of the testimony of two
doctors, with no indication that a PHS doctor actually certified her with this affliction).
226. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 24-25.
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Shakespeare,227 there was little public or judicial criticism of this
categorical exclusion from the United States of all those “afflicted”
with homosexuality. In 1967, the same session in which the United
States Supreme Court unanimously struck down anti-miscegenation
laws in Loving v. Virginia, the Court also upheld the exclusion of
homosexuals from the United States as “psychopathic personal-
it[ies].” 228 This was consistent with the treatment of lesbians and
gay men in the U.S. legal system generally at that time, and for many
years afterwards.229
Given this history, it is not surprising that the only same-sex
couple ever to argue in a federal court of appeals that its marriage
should be recognized for immigration purposes lost. That defeat oc-
curred in the pre-DOMA Ninth Circuit case of Adams v. Howerton.230
a. Adams v. Howerton
Adams v. Howerton was one of the more poorly postured attempts
at impact litigation in the history of American jurisprudence. Only
eight years after the Supreme Court decided that Congress intended
to make it impossible for any gay person ever to enter the United
States, Richard Adams and Anthony Sullivan commenced a challenge
to the INS’s231 refusal to recognize their “marriage” for the purpose
of Mr. Sullivan’s application for lawful permanent residence status.232
Mr. Sullivan had previously been granted permanent resident status
based on a marriage to a woman, but INS revoked that status after
227. Boutilier, 387 U.S. at 130 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (referencing Boutilier v. INS,
363 F.2d 488, 497-98 (2d Cir. 1966) (Moore, J., dissenting)). Even those like Justice
Douglas, who did not agree that a homosexual should have been excluded as “afflicted
with psychopathic personality,” hardly recognized the equality of LGBT people in 1967.
They merely felt that they should be tolerated, accepting the psychological understanding
at the time that “[t]he homosexual is one, who by some freak, is the product of an arrested
development.” Id. at 127.
228. Id. at 118.
229. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (finding no constitutional
infirmity in a Georgia law that made same-sex sex a crime punishable by one to twenty
years in prison). Notably, Chief Justice Burger was so incensed by the very suggestion
that homosexual sex might not be criminal that he felt compelled to write a separate con-
currence quoting Blackstone for the proposition that it was an “infamous crime against
nature” of “ ‘deeper malignity’ than rape.” Id. at 197 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *215).
230. 673 F.2d 1036 (1982).
231. INS was the name of the immigration service when it was a part of the Department
of Justice before it was broken up into the USCIS, ICE and CBP and moved to the
Department of Homeland Security as a part of the response to the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Our History, supra note 119.
232. Adams v. Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1121 (C.D. Cal. 1980).
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they were convinced that the marriage was not, in fact, bona fide.233
Later, Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Adams, who resided in Los Angeles, read
in a magazine that a county clerk in Boulder, Colorado, was issuing
marriage licenses to same-sex couples.234 They traveled to Boulder,
obtained a marriage license, and were married by a minister.235
Given the near plenary power of Congress regarding immigra-
tion issues236 and the Supreme Court’s recent endorsement of con-
gressional intent to exclude all homosexuals from the United States,
it is not surprising that Mssrs. Adams and Sullivan lost. However,
it is surprising that INS officials, BIA members and federal judges
throughout the process went out of their way to humiliate the couple
and close every possible door to them and other couples in the future,
even though it required a departure from both precedent and long-
standing statutory construction of the INA.237
First, the INS rejected Adams’s immigrant visa petition on be-
half of Sullivan, stating “[y]ou have failed to establish that a bona
fide marital relationship can exist between two faggots.” 238 Then,
the district court and the court of appeals both chose to go out of their
way to clarify that no same-sex couple should even dream of ever
being legally married.
As Chief Judge Hill concluded in his relatively empathetic dis-
trict court opinion,
The time may come, far in the future, when contracts and arrange-
ments between persons of the same sex who abide together will
be recognized and enforced under state law. . . . But in my opinion,
even such a substantial change in the prevailing mores would
not reach the point where such relationships would be character-
ized as “marriages.” At most, they would become personal relation-
ships having some, but not all, of the legal attributes of marriage.
And even when and if that day arrives, two persons of the same
233. Id. at 1120.
234. John Caldwell, Legally Wed in Colorado, 1975: Pioneering Gay Couple Anthony
Sullivan and Richard Adams Didn’t Just Get Legally Married 29 Years Ago: They Stood
Up and Demanded to be Recognized, THE ADVOCATE, Mar. 30, 2004, available at http://
www.thefreelibrary.com/Legally+wed+in+Colorado%2c+1975%3a+pioneering+gay
+couple+Anthony+Sullivan...-a0114630941.
235. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1120.
236. See supra note 15 (discussing congressional plenary power in immigration).
237. This was a sign of the times and a preview of Chief Justice Burger’s concurrence
in Bowers v. Hardwick. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (quoting from Burger’s
concurrence in Bowers).
238. Adam Francoeur, The Enemy Within: Construction of U.S. Immigration Law and
Policy and the Homoterrorist Threat, 3 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 345, 346 (2007) (quoting Letter
from Immigration and Naturalization Service to Richard Adams (Nov. 24, 1975) in
STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 139 (2d ed. 1997)).
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sex, like those before the Court today, will not be thought of as
being “spouses” to each other within the meaning of the immi-
gration laws.239
Holding that the Adams-Howerton “marriage” was not cognizable
under the INA did not require Chief Judge Hill to predict that their
relationship would never be recognized anywhere as a marriage.240
Nor did it require both the court of appeals and the district court to
rule on every possible step of the test for marriage validity under
immigration law.
The courts could have relied on the invalidity of the Boulder
same-sex “marriage” under the law of Colorado where it was cele-
brated. The Colorado Attorney General had already stated his opinion
that such same-sex marriages were of no legal effect in Colorado.241
The court also could have followed the established idea that marriage-
based federal immigration benefits could not be granted on the basis
of a relationship that would not be recognized as a marriage in any
state.242 Instead, the courts went on to decide the case on the broader
and more exceptional ground of federal public policy/definition.
The Ninth Circuit formulated a two-part test for marriage recog-
nition under the INA: (1) “whether the marriage is valid under state
law”; and (2) “whether that state-approved marriage qualifies under
the [INA].” 243 Although it first referred to the Colorado Attorney
General’s opinion that Adams and Sullivan were not married in that
state, the court chose not to “make an educated guess as to how the
Colorado courts would decide this issue.” 244 Instead, it skipped to
the second issue and decided the case “solely upon construction of
section 201(b)” of the INA and the court’s educated guess as to what
Congress intended.245
239. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1125. Chief Judge Hill proceeded to predict that any
recognition of these non-marital relationships under the INA would require federal
legislation, presumably in the nature of the UAFA currently pending in Congress. See
infra Part VI.A for a discussion of UAFA.
240. In fact, Adams and Sullivan not only lived to see the day when their relationship
could be recognized as a “marriage” in California, but their relationship survived those
three decades of life together as immigration outlaws. Caldwell, supra note 234.
241. Adams, 486 F. Supp. at 1122. Chief Judge Hill characterized the Attorney General’s
opinion as “an informal unpublished opinion,” but it was addressed to a member of the
Colorado legislature, and it was cited as a part of the Administrative Record of the case.
Id. In addition, as Chief Judge Hill explained in his opinion, at that time “no court ha[d]
yet recognized a union between persons of the same sex as being a legal marriage.” Id.
at 1122-23.
242. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text (discussing an opinion focusing
on the importance of legal recognition in at least one state).
243. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1038 (9th Cir. 1982).
244. Id. at 1039.
245. Id.
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The court covered all the bases with regard to its construction
of section 201(b), grounding its holding against INA recognition of
same-sex marriages on three different forms of judicial deference.
Citing the recent Supreme Court decision in Boutilier v. INS, the
court deferred to Congress’s desire to exclude all foreign homosexuals
from the United States as “psychopathic personalities” under the
INA.246 Of course, this was a valid reason for finding a strong public
policy for refusing to allow a gay man to immigrate or remain in the
United States on the basis of his same-sex marriage. After all, the
INA would be internally inconsistent if it barred gay men and lesbians
from entering the United States while recognizing a right to immi-
grate on the basis of their same-sex relationship. This logic is similar
to that underlying the federal public policy against recognition of
polygamous marriages.247
The court emphasized that it was also deferring to the INS, since
courts are “required to accord substantial deference to” the interpre-
tation of a federal statute by the agency charged with its enforcement,
and follow that construction “ ‘unless there are compelling indications
that it is wrong.’ ” 248 This is a widely cited principle, but one that
courts, including the Ninth Circuit, often appear to adhere to when
they agree with the agency, but ignore when they do not.249
Unfortunately, the Adams court did not stop there. It ventured
on into uncharted territory, relying on the INS’s examination of mar-
ital bona fides under the INA to demonstrate that Congress meant
to create a new federal definition of “marriage” for immigration pur-
poses in the INA beyond “the mere validity of a marriage under state
law.” 250 Of course, Congress does have the power to define its own
246. Id. at 1040.
247. For a discussion of polygamy in the context of immigration, see supra Part III.C.3.
248. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (quoting N.Y. Dep’t of Soc. Serv. v. Dublino, 413 U.S.
405, 421 (1973)).
249. See also Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1420-22 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, C.J.,
dissenting) (accusing the majority of failing to defer to the BIA, explaining that “Congress
entrusted the administration of the statute to the INS; the policy choices that govern are
the agency’s not ours.”). Given the number of times federal courts have overturned
facially reasonable agency interpretations, the list of possible citations in support of this
proposition is endless. Compare Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040 (according “special deference”
to INS’s construction of the INA), with Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 876 (9th Cir. 2002)
(“We . . . review de novo legal interpretations of the INA’s requirements.”), and Kahn, 36
F.3d at 1414 (per curiam) (finding that “[t]he Board erred as a matter of law in adopting
state law as the conclusive measure of family ties”), and Taing v. Chertoff, 526 F. Supp.
2d 177, 180-81, 187 (D. Mass. 2007) (refusing to recognize BIA decision denying the sur-
viving spouse of a deceased U.S. citizen the right to immigrant status, because “deference
to an agency’s interpretation of the law does not equate with blind faith. . . . [I]f the
Agency’s interpretation of the statute is found to be inconsistent with the statutory
language, legislative history, or purpose of the statute, it must be invalidated.”).
250. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1039.
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terms in legislation within its authority, so long as it does not violate
the U.S. Constitution in the process. In Adams, however, the court
proceeded to develop an expansive view of the federal definition of
marriage extending far beyond the previous precedents and its reli-
ance on express statutory expressions of federal public policy.
The Adams court looked to congressional silence regarding a
specific definition of “marriage” in the text of the INA.251 The court
assumed that legislative silence indicated, not continuing deference
to state law within its traditional authority over marriage, but a spe-
cific federal meaning of “marriage” that was in the minds of members
of Congress when they enacted the INA, including the words “spouse”
and “marriage.” 252 It looked at the opposite-sex only definitions of
marriage in the 1971 edition of Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary and the 1979 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary to indicate
what Congress must have had in mind in 1965 or earlier.253 Of course,
it should have added the more relevant fact that no state recognized
same-sex marriage at the time when Congress drafted the INA, but
that would have been an admission that Adams and Sullivan were
not married in Colorado, obviating the need for this discussion.
In light of the specific exclusion of homosexuals from the United
States, the court’s opinion in Adams should be readily distinguish-
able from any future cases in a world without DOMA. Fortunately,
the court’s expansive language constructing a non-textually-based
federal definition of marriage has not been expanded upon. How-
ever, it has given birth to at least one other Ninth Circuit opinion,
Kahn v. INS, in which the majority found that an unmarried hetero-
sexual partner qualified as “family” for purposes of relief from re-
moval and that the BIA “erred as a matter of law in adopting state
law as the conclusive measure of family ties.” 254 As discussed below,
both the majority and minority opinions in Kahn also undermine the
definitional rationale supporting Adams v. Howerton.
Part IV of this article is an argument that the idea of an implied
federal definition of marriage under the INA was a misguided de-
parture from many decades of constructing the terms “marriage”
and “spouse” under U.S. immigration law. The other bases under-
lying Adams v. Howerton were sound. They all, however, have been
251. Id. at 1040.
252. Id. The case is silent as to when congressional understanding of the term marriage
froze in light of the many recodifications and amendments of federal immigration law
and its use of the terms “marriage” and “spouse” since 1917. Given the fact that same-
sex marriage had never been recognized in the United States before 1982, any date could
have been chosen to justify this specific lack of intent rationale.
253. Id.
254. 36 F.3d 1412, 1415 (9th Cir. 1994).
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superseded by intervening legislation and societal developments. Of
course, this insight is not practically relevant as long as DOMA re-
mains in force, since it expressly defines “marriage” and “spouse” as
the union of one man and one woman.255
b. The Immigration Act of 1990, DOMA and the Current
Status of Same-Sex Spouses Under the INA
Eight years after the Ninth Circuit decision in Adams v.
Howerton, Congress substantially revised numerous areas of immi-
gration law when it enacted the Immigration Act of 1990. Among
other changes, it largely rewrote the provisions related to inadmissi-
bility and exclusion from the United States, including repeal of the
provision excluding “sexual deviants,” the last version of the homo-
sexual bar.256 As illustrated in Part IV below, this change in the INA
would have undermined the logic of Adams, possibly leading to the
recognition of same-sex marriages under the INA when they were
later recognized by U.S. states. However, that was not to be.
In December 1996, a state court held that Hawaii could not dis-
criminate against same-sex couples in issuing marriage licenses since
there was no compelling state interest behind that gender-based
restriction.257 Hawaiians soon amended their state constitution to
empower the legislature to prohibit same-sex marriages.258 Congress
reacted even more quickly and extremely. By September 1996, be-
fore the Hawaiian trial court issued its final decision, Congress had
already enacted the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to define
“marriage” and “spouse” for all federal purposes and to affirm states’
power to refuse to recognize marriages entered in other states.259
States followed suit with their own mini-DOMAs and amendments
enshrining marriage discrimination in their state constitutions.260
DOMA clarified that same-sex marriages would not be recognized
under federal statutes, whether or not Adams has ongoing validity,
so there have been no successful attempts to rethink Adams even
255. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21, 1996)
(codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)).
256. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 25, 28.
257. Baehr v. Miike, No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235, at *20-*22 (Cir. Ct. Haw. Dec. 3,
1996).
258. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW
1079-80 (2d ed. 2004).
259. Defense of Marriage Act §§ 2(a), 3, 110 Stat. at 2419.
260. TRADITIONAL VALUES COALITION, SPECIAL REPORT: 50-STATE SURVEY OF MARRIAGE
PROTECTION AMENDMENTS (Nov. 2008), http://www.traditionalvalues.org/read/3450/special
-report-50state-survey-of-marriage-protection-amendments/.
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though states have begun recognizing same-sex marriage over the
last seven years.
Currently, because of DOMA, the relationships of U.S. citizens
or lawful permanent residents with foreign nationals of the same-sex
are generally invisible under the INA, even if the couple is legally
married in a U.S. state or a foreign country.261 These couples receive
none of the benefits of “marriage” under the INA, including the right
to remain together in the United States.262 This leaves many U.S.
citizens with the untenable option faced by Mayor Lown: terminate
your relationship or leave your career, family, friends, and property
in the United States behind to live in de facto exile abroad.263 When
a same-sex couple has children, the choices can be even more uncon-
scionable. For instance, one highly publicized current case involves
a Filipina named Shirley Tan, who is facing deportation in spite of
her twenty-year relationship with a U.S. citizen and in spite of her
twin twelve-year-old U.S. citizen sons, whom the couple is raising
in California.264
Although same-sex relationships still are not recognized for the
purpose of issuing most benefits under the INA, the USCIS and State
Department now recognize non-marital life partnerships in two in-
stances. First, if one of the partners has a visa to reside in the United
States for temporary work or study, that person’s foreign partner may
accompany him or her in B-2 visitor (tourist) status.265 Second, the
State Department recently changed its regulations to allow it discre-
tion in granting derivative status to the partners of U.S. diplomats,
consular officers and some other foreign officials if the partnership
is legally recognized in the sending country.266 Both categories in-
clude both same-sex and opposite sex couples as well as other house-
hold members.267
261. Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 110 Stat. at 2419.
262. See Susan Young, A Gay Mom Faces Deportation, PEOPLE, Apr. 20, 2009, at 92
(explaining that “the federal government doesn’t allow gay spouses to sponsor partners
for citizenship”).
263. See supra note 1 and accompanying text for a description of Mayor Lown’s story.
264. Julia Preston, Bill Proposes Immigration Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y. TIMES,
June 3, 2009, at A19; Young, supra note 262, at 90-92.
265. 9 F.A.M. § 41.31 N14.4 (U.S. Dep’t of State Foreign Affairs Manual provision for
granting B-2 classification to household members of nonimmigrant visa holders, including
cohabitating partners).
266. 22 C.F.R. § 41.21 (2010). On July 14, 2009, the Department of State amended
22 C.F.R. § 41.21 to expand the category of “immediate relatives” recognized under
Immigration and Nationality Act § 101(a)(15)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(A) (2006),adding
individuals who: (1) “[a]re not members of some other household”; (2) “[w]ill reside regu-
larly in the household of the” nonimmigrant visa-holder; (3) “[a]re recognized as immediate
family members . . . by the sending Government as demonstrated by eligibility for rights
and benefits”; and (4) “[a]re individually authorized by the” U.S. Department of State.
267. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 37 n.88.
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Of course, this purely non-immigrant option does not assist the
partners of lawful permanent residents or U.S. citizens, even if they
are diplomats.268 In fact, in a cruel irony, a marriage with a U.S. citi-
zen or resident that is useless to help a foreign national under the
INA can still hurt her. Many visas require that a successful applicant
have nonimmigrant intent, i.e., the intent to return to her home coun-
try after the temporary visa expires.269 A recognized relationship with
a U.S. citizen or resident can evidence intent to stay in the United
States, thus disqualifying the foreign national partner from non-
immigrant visa categories such as tourist status, student status and
some employment-based categories for which she might otherwise
be eligible.270
IV. ADAMS V. HOWERTON REVISITED: WHY ADAMS SHOULD NOT
CONTROL FUTURE QUESTIONS OF SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
RECOGNITION
Adams v. Howerton should no longer control if a similar case is
decided after DOMA is repealed or struck down.
In Adams, the Ninth Circuit found that Mr. Adams’s “marriage”
was invalid under federal immigration law for three reasons: (1) in-
ternal inconsistency of same-sex marriage recognition with the ex-
press inadmissibility of homosexuals in another section of the INA;
(2) deference to the INS; and (3) the implied intent of Congress to
create a federal definition of “marriage,” frozen in time and inde-
pendent of state definitions, when it used the term in the INA.271
The first and most convincing rationale is no longer relevant after
the repeal of the homosexual exclusion in 1990.272 It is impossible to
say what the USCIS opinion might be in the future and what def-
erence it may be due, so it is impossible to predict how the second
reason would play in a hypothetical future case. In any case, despite
frequent rhetoric about deference to USCIS officials, one does not
have to be a cynic to find that courts tend to defer to immigration
authorities only when they agree with the authorities’ conclusion in
a given case.273
268. Id. at 37-39.
269. U.S. Dep’t of State, Visa Denials, http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/denials/denials
_1361.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2009).
270. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 38-39.
271. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039-41 (9th Cir. 1982).
272. See FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 28 (discussing the Immigration Act of
1990, which removed the ban on homosexuals).
273. See supra note 249 and accompanying text (discussing judicial tendency to agree
with agency decisions only when they want to).
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There is a strong argument that the common meaning of “mar-
riage” has changed since 1982. In fact, the most recent online edi-
tion of the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, the same source cited by
the court in Adams, expressly includes same-sex couples in one of
its recognized definitions of the word “marriage.” 274 As demon-
strated below, the Adams court’s discovery of a specific new federal
definition of marriage for immigration purposes was also a misguided
and unnecessary departure from over eighty years of immigration
precedent, and it should not be followed.
A. The Homosexual Bar to Admissibility was Repealed in 1990
Back in 1975, when Anthony Sullivan applied for lawful resident
status on the basis of his same sex relationship with Richard Adams,
Mr. Sullivan could have been barred from even entering the United
States on the basis of his sexual orientation. The United States
Supreme Court had ruled just eight years earlier that this homosexual
exclusion was both intended by Congress and permissible under the
U.S. Constitution.275
In this context, it was reasonable for the Ninth Circuit to inter-
pret the term “marriage” so as to refuse to grant Mr. Sullivan lawful
permanent residence on the basis of his same-sex relationship. In fact,
that construction of the term “marriage,” based on a policy clearly ex-
pressed in the INA, fits neatly within the logic supporting the other,
rare federal public policy exceptions to the general reliance on state
marriage law.
The INA, however, has changed since Adams was decided. The
homosexual bar to admission was eliminated in the 1990 rewrite of
the Immigration and Nationality Act.276 Absent DOMA, this removed
the express textual basis for finding a federal public policy against
recognition of same-sex marriage.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Two-Prong Test for “Marriage” Recognition
Under the INA is Oversimplified and Misleading
Although the final conclusion in Adams was correct, the court’s
unnecessary over-generalization and overreaching in that case have
left at least two problematic legacies. First, it has left an oversimpli-
fied two-prong test that has been cited in other contexts.277 The second
274. Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Marriage, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/marriage (last visited Apr. 7, 2010). The court in Adams cited the 1971 edition
of Merriam-Webster’s Third New International Dictionary. Adams, 673 F.2d at 1040.
275. Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967).
276. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 28.
277. See, e.g., 2 Immigr. L. Serv. 2d (West) § 7:5 (2009) (describing the Adams “two-step
analysis” as a general rule to guide the analysis of whether any particular marriage is valid
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and more troubling legacy of Adams was its misguided view of the
second, federal, prong of its test as an invitation for courts and im-
migration officials to construct a new federal definition of marriage
(even if Congress does not), largely independent of any particular
state definition.278
As described above, the Ninth Circuit formulated a two-part test
for whether a marriage will be recognized under the INA: (1) “whether
the marriage is valid under state law”; and (2) “whether that state-
approved marriage qualifies under the [INA].” 279 Although these
two considerations are indeed valid, this overly simple method of
conceptualizing marriage validity under the INA is rarely helpful
and often confusing in other contexts. Unfortunately, although the
Ninth Circuit now appears to recognize that the test is too general
for many contexts,280 the Adams test has sometimes been cited as if
it were a comprehensive test of marriage validity in all cases.281
Step one of the Adams test focuses on state law, ignoring the
important question of whether a foreign marriage is valid where it
was celebrated, a criterion that Congress later set out expressly in
section 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(i) of the INA.282 It also fails to recognize the
possibility that even a marriage celebrated in a U.S. state may be
subject to the strong public policy exception of a sister state, leading
to its lack of validity in that state.283 In the unlikely event that the
court intentionally ignored this issue in announcing the Adams test,
it would raise serious doubt as to whether a century’s worth of cases
involving conflicting state laws regarding the marriages of close
relatives are still valid.
Step two of the Adams test is even more misleading. By combin-
ing the three unique and uncommon categories of marriage that were
subject to express public policy objections under federal immigration
under the INA); see also U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERV., ADJUDICATOR’S FIELD
MANUAL § 21.3(a)(2)(J) (2007), available at http://www.stthomas.edu/ipc/legal/ImmigLaw/
AFM%20Feb07/21.3.pdf (citing Adams for the proposition that “[d]efining marriage under
immigration law is a question of Federal law, not state law” in the context of reasoning
that “USCIS has no legal basis on which to recognize a change of sex so that a marriage
between two persons born of the same sex can be recognized”). It should be noted, however,
that section 21.3(a)(2)(J) of the Adjudicator’s Field Manual was revised January 21, 2009,
and no longer cites Adams. See 2009 FIELD MANUAL, supra note 180 (omitting mention
of Adams).
278. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1982).
279. Id. at 1038.
280. See infra note 286 and accompanying text (discussing the more recent test adopted
by the Ninth Circuit in assessing marriage validity).
281. 2 Immigr. L. Serv. 2d (West) § 7:5 (2009).
282. Immigration and Naturalization Act § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(d)(1)
(A)(i)(i) (2006).
283. See supra note 44 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Full Faith and
Credit clause and its limitations.
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law and lumping these rare cases under the same heading with the
issue of “marriage fraud,” the overriding concern of immigration offi-
cials in this area, the court overemphasized the importance of fed-
eral law in determining marital status outside the issue of marital
bona fides. It implied that any new issue related to marriage recog-
nition should be judged as a de novo question of federal law and spe-
cific congressional intent, regardless of state law.284 This idea is con-
trary to more than eighty years of BIA opinions and federal case law
regarding immigration and numerous other subjects.285
Fortunately, the Ninth Circuit seems to be evolving its formu-
lation of the steps necessary for recognition of a marriage under the
INA. In 2002, in a footnote in Agyeman v. INS, it described a three-
prong test for marriage validity more similar to that described in
Part II of this article: (1) “legal[ ] valid[ity]”; (2) “bona fide[s]”; and
(3) no public policy exception.286 This conceptualization remains some-
what misleading. For instance, the court seems to categorize federal
objections to a marriage together with validity in the place where the
marriage was celebrated rather than with the strong public policy
exceptions recognized by states of domicile.287 Obviously, this article
finds it more accurate and useful to conceptualize DOMA’s federal
exception to recognition of a marriage that was valid where cele-
brated, not as an all-encompassing new definition of “marriage” for
federal purposes, but as a strong federal public policy exception to
recognizing certain marriages even if valid under state law. This
approach is consistent with that of federal courts in other contexts288
and even with the opinion of at least one Ninth Circuit judge.289
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Search for a Broad Federal Definition of
“Marriage” Under the INA Is Misguided
For over seventy years, federal immigration law has consis-
tently looked to state marriage law to determine marital status for
284. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982).
285. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of federal reliance on state law to determine
status in certain circumstances.
286. 296 F.3d 871, 879 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002).
287. Id. (citing Adams, rather than referring to the statutory requirement of validity
where the marriage was celebrated, as the support for prong one. This implies that
federal definition criteria fall under the concept of “legal[] valid[ity],” rather than policy-
based exceptions).
288. See, e.g., In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 133-34, 134 n.3 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004)
(applying DOMA to U.S. bankruptcy law and finding “that the federal government has
announced a strong and clear countervailing policy” providing an exception to the general
rule of international comity as applied to a Canadian same-sex marriage).
289. For discussion of that judge’s decision, see infra note 299 and accompanying text.
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immigration purposes. A valid state marriage, not entered for the
purpose of evading U.S. immigration law, is generally valid for im-
migration purposes.290
In Adams, the court veered sharply from this traditional path.
Relying on precedent regarding the unique issue of “sham marriages”
within the context of immigration, it stretched that exceptional doc-
trine to legitimize a federalized definition of “marriage” and “spouse”
that Congress never indicated an intent to create.291 It inferred that
congressional silence with regard to the meaning of “marriage” was
meant to freeze the idea of marriage for immigration purposes as it
was commonly understood in dictionaries from the 1960s or earlier.292
Of course, the Adams decision was also a departure from the nor-
mal reliance of federal law on state law definitions of personal and
family relationships not only in the context of immigration law,293
but in federal bankruptcy law,294 federal criminal law,295 federal tax
law,296 Social Security,297 copyright law, and other areas of federal
law as well.298
At the time when Adams was decided, its departure from prece-
dent may not have been as obvious as it is today. After all, in an era
when same-sex marriage was recognized by no U.S. state or foreign
country, Adams’s federal definition of marriage did not conflict with
any state definition.
Today, however, a DOMA-free court wishing to follow Adams
by constructing an exclusively heterosexual definition of marriage
would find it difficult to rely on congressional intent. Now that some
states define “marriage” to include gay and lesbian couples, uphold-
ing the federal definition established in Adams would require a
choice between that silently implied “intent” and the long-standing
290. Immigration and Nationality Act § 245(e)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3) (2006).
291. There was language regarding a common understanding of marriage in Lutwak
v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 609 (1953), and in a previous Ninth Circuit case related
to marriage fraud, United States v. Sacco, 428 F.2d 264, 270-71 (9th Cir. 1970). No other
court, however, had referred to a separate federal definition of marriage under the INA
outside of the context of immigration-motivated “marriage fraud.”
292. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982).
293. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of a
federal definition of marriage.
294. See supra note 68 and accompanying text for discussion of state law involvement
in bankruptcy.
295. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text for discussion of state law involve-
ment in federal criminal law.
296. See supra note 71 and accompanying text for discussion of state law involvement
in federal tax issues.
297. See supra note 72 and accompanying text for discussion of state law involvement
in social security.
298. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
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congressional and judicial assumption that states define what consti-
tutes a marriage. This deference is a well-established federal policy,
which Congress would not likely cast aside without providing so
expressly, as it did with DOMA itself.
D. Kahn v. INS
In pursuit of a specific federal definition of family and marriage
similar to that first discussed in Adams v. Howerton, the Ninth Circuit
found twelve years later in Kahn v. United States that an unmarried
couple constituted “family” for purposes of cancellation of deportation
under INA section 212(c), even though they were clearly not married
under the state law of California where they were domiciled, since
that state did not recognize “common law marriage.” 299 Constructing
an independent federal definition under the INA, the court found that
the BIA had not acted rationally in relying exclusively on state law
to determine whether or not the couple was “family.” 300
Circuit Judge Kozinski wrote a blistering dissent. He concluded
that, “[b]y purporting to establish a federal law of domestic relations,
the majority boldly goes where no federal court has gone before.” 301
He did not approve, concluding that “[t]he majority’s freestyle adoption
of a national definition of ‘family’ falls well outside [federal judicial]
competence, and is bad policy to boot.” 302
Clearly, the majority and Circuit Judge Kozinski disagreed
strongly in Kahn. In fact, both sides took the unusual step of contin-
uing their argument in a long amended opinion and a further dissent
issued six months after the original opinions.303 They did, however,
agree on at least one point. Both sides apparently found it proper
to focus on state law in determining whether a marriage exists for
the purpose of obtaining immigration benefits, such as green card
status.304 Circuit Judge Kozinski found it entirely appropriate for the
BIA to rely on state law to determine who constitutes “family” for vir-
tually any federal purpose.305 The majority narrowed its opinion to
cancellation of removal under INA section 212(c) where the word
“family” should not result in different results depending on a person’s
state of domicile.306 It distinguished that situation from “marriage”
299. Kahn v. INS, 20 F.3d 960, 962 (9th Cir. 1994).
300. Id.
301. Kahn v. INS, 36 F.3d 1412, 1420 (9th Cir. 1994) (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
302. Id. at 1421.
303. Id. at 1412.
304. Id. at 1414 (majority opinion), 1418 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
305. Id. at 1416-17 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 1414 (majority opinion).
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recognition for purpose of gaining admission to the United States,
when “the INA defines a ‘qualifying marriage’ as one which ‘was
entered into in accordance with the laws of the place where the mar-
riage took place.’ ” 307 Of course, this casts doubt on the breadth of the
federal definition of “marriage” in Adams, since that case involved
marriage-based immigration benefits, not family-based cancellation
of removal.
V. SAME-SEX MARRIAGE RECOGNITION UNDER THE INA IF DOMA IS
REPEALED OR STRUCK DOWN
Unfortunately, the absence of DOMA would not leave a clear,
uniform definition of “spouse” and “marriage” under U.S. immigration
law and precedent. As demonstrated above, however, that would not
be unusual. It is the normal state of things that any disputed “mar-
riage” must be evaluated for recognition under U.S. immigration
law.308 Immigration officials should apply the same rules and focus
on state law that they have always applied in cases where marriage
validity is not clear for immigration purposes.
Of course, it is possible that Congress might provide future guid-
ance in legislation or through legislative history if it repeals DOMA.309
It is, perhaps, more likely that we will be left with no clear instruction
as to how to interpret state same-sex marriages in the immigration
context in the event that DOMA is repealed or struck down.310 This
307. Id. at 1415 (citing Immigration and Nationality Act § 216(d)(1)(A)(i)(i), 8 U.S.C. §
1186a(d)(1)(A)(i)(i) (2006)). In a subsequent, unpublished 2008 opinion, the Ninth Circuit
upheld a BIA opinion refusing to recognize a same-sex partner as a qualifying relative
for purposes of cancellation of removal. Hasibuan v. Mukasey, 305 F. App’x 372, 374 (9th
Cir. 2008). Circuit Judge Kozinski referenced this difference fourteen years earlier in his
dissent in Kahn, pointing out that the majority’s construction of a new category of
“family” for unmarried, cohabitating couples in a state that does not recognize common
law marriage was no fairer than the INS’s refusal to do so: “Isn’t the case of gay and
lesbian couples — many of whom have made long-term commitments and are raising
children — a far more compelling one? Kahn and her boyfriend, after all, have the option
of getting married; they need only get a license.” Kahn, 36 F.3d at 1419.
308. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the steps to marriage recognition under
the INA.
309. For instance, one current legislative proposal for repealing DOMA expressly
includes language clarifying that marriages valid in the state where celebrated will be
recognized under federal law. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (discussing a bill
to repeal DOMA).
310. See Chris Johnson, No DOMA Repeal Next Year, D.C. AGENDA (Dec. 10, 2009),
http://dcagenda.com/2009/12/10/no-doma-repeal-next-year-nadler/ (singling out the “cer-
tainty provision,” that would require federal recognition of state-recognized marriages
regardless of the couple’s state of domicile, in the pending legislation to repeal DOMA
as language that “could cause political problems for House members seeking re-election”).
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Part assumes that is the case and addresses the issue based on exist-
ing precedent that may be relevant.
If DOMA were repealed today, same-sex marriages should be ex-
amined under the three-step test described in Part II and illustrated
in Part III, above. As in all immigration cases, the first requirement
would be the validity of the marriage under the law of the place where
the marriage was celebrated. If that state or foreign country recog-
nizes same-sex marriage and if the couple in question fulfilled all of
the other procedural and substantive requirements for marriage in
that jurisdiction (e.g., licensing, age of consent, residence require-
ments, etc.), then the marriage would presumably be valid.
Next, under step two, immigration officials or judges should look
to see if the marriage runs afoul of a strong public policy objection
to same-sex marriage in the couple’s state of domicile or intended
domicile, or under federal law.
As described in Parts II and III above, federal public policy ob-
jections to a marriage have been extremely rare and always based
on some express federal disapproval in the immigration context. As
demonstrated in Part IV above, Adams v. Howerton should no longer
control. There presumably would be no strong federal public policy
against same-sex marriage recognition in a world without either
DOMA or the homosexual bar.
Thus, prior to undergoing the usual, strict personal examination
of marital bona fides, only review under the state law of the couple’s
domicile, or intended domicile, would remain for determining whether
a same-sex marriage, recognized where celebrated, is valid under
federal immigration law.
This still leaves a complex set of issues related to the strong
public policy objection of the couple’s current or future state of domi-
cile. Assuming that a marriage is valid in the state of its celebration,
the following scenarios might occur, depending on the law of the state
of domicile.
A. States of Domicile Without Mini-DOMAs or Constitutional
Marriage Amendments
The easy cases would be those in which the state of domicile
would recognize the same-sex marriage. Currently, the list of U.S.
jurisdictions falling in this category would include the District of
Columbia as well as Massachusetts, Connecticut, Iowa, Vermont and
New Hampshire, the states currently issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples.311 It would also include New York, Maryland and
311. NCSL Marriage Report, supra note 4.
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Rhode Island, since those jurisdictions, although not licensing same-
sex marriages themselves, have all recognized same-sex marriages
that are celebrated in a state or nation that does license them.312
There should be no federal distinction here between marriages
validly celebrated in a sister state and those validly celebrated in a
foreign country, so long as the state of domicile does not draw such
a distinction.
A few states, such as New Mexico and New Jersey, neither recog-
nize same-sex marriage nor have laws or constitutional amendments
prohibiting it.313 Since these states have expressed no strong public
policy objection to same-sex marriage, their domiciliaries would not
trigger a state public policy exception to the general rule of recognition
if they marry elsewhere.314 The marriages should be recognized under
immigration law in a world without DOMA.
The cases above are relatively easy, simply answered by adher-
ence to the consistent precedent decisions in other controversial mar-
riage cases.
B. States with Mini-DOMAs or Constitutional Marriage
Amendments
The difficult cases are those involving states of domicile that
have adopted state laws and constitutional amendments disapprov-
ing of marriage recognition for gay men and lesbians.315 Would U.S.
immigration law recognize marriages valid where celebrated, but
clearly rejected by the couple’s state of domicile or intended domicile?
Unfortunately, while the precedents discussed above give us some
guidance in these cases, they also contain ambiguities that make
the answer to this question more difficult.
If the highly demanding requirement of most consanguinity
and anti-miscegenation cases is followed, a same-sex marriage, valid
where celebrated, would be recognized for immigration purposes re-
gardless of the couple’s state of domicile.316 Those cases recognized
only criminal prohibitions of cohabitation or evasion of state law as
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. See supra Part II.B (discussing when public policy is strong enough to warrant
an exception to the rule in favor of marriage recognition).
315. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures, twenty-nine states
have adopted state constitutional amendments defining marriage to exclude gay and
lesbian couples. NCSL Marriage Report, supra note 4. Hawaii’s constitution was amended
in a manner that was neutral towards the subject of same-sex marriage; it merely clarified
that the state legislature had the sole authority to make that determination. Id.
316. See supra Part III.B.1-2 (discussing immigration decisions based on anti-
miscegenation and consanguinity laws).
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sufficiently strong state public policy exceptions to negate recognition
under federal immigration law.317 Since the United States Supreme
Court has held that same-sex sexual intimacy, and presumably co-
habitation, cannot be constitutionally criminalized, then no state
could enforce a criminal law that rises to the standard traditionally
required to express a sufficiently strong state public policy.318
Certainly those states with constitutional prohibitions of same-
sex marriage are likely to argue that they express a sufficiently strong
state public policy to trigger an exception under United States immi-
gration law. They have a stronger argument than did states objecting
to noncriminal, but unrecognized, consanguinity and miscegenation
in marriage for two reasons. First, passionate and extensive debates
and public referenda were frequently involved in passing the consti-
tutional amendments in these cases.319 Second, and more important,
in light of the United States Supreme Court opinion in Lawrence v.
Texas, the states have no constitutionally permissible option to ex-
press their objections to same-sex sexual relationships in the form of
criminal prohibitions.320 At least where state constitutional amend-
ments expressly determine that same-sex marriages celebrated in
other states, as well as those celebrated in the state in question, are
invalid, they are the most specific and extreme public policy objection
constitutionally possible.
Of course, Lawrence v. Texas and Romer v. Evans321 could help
both sides in this case. As discussed below, courts might find that
state anti-same-sex marriage amendments are based on animus
against lesbians and gay men, therefore violating the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.322 In fact, it might take a fine
scalpel to separate constitutional amendments demonstrating a
sufficiently strong public policy objection to same-sex marriage from
animus towards people who are only attracted to the same sex,
particularly in the angry political context in which many of those
amendments were enacted.
If courts find that state marriage amendments violate the
Fourteenth Amendment, they would likely also find that the Due
317. See supra Part III.B (discussing the criteria for “strongly held public policy”
sufficient to warrant nonrecognition of marriages that were valid where celebrated).
318. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (finding a liberty interest in
private, consensual homosexual conduct). Of course, a state law criminalizing out-of-state
same-sex marriage would also be constitutionally suspect. Id.; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 633-34, 635-36 (1996).
319. NCSL Marriage Report, supra note 4.
320. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
321. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
322. See infra notes 344-351 and accompanying text (discussing a pending challenge
to the constitutionality of marriage discrimination).
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Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause as incorporated into the
Fifth Amendment militate in favor of a more inclusive construction
of the undefined term “marriage” in the INA. However, this might not
be necessary.
As the United States Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed in
other immigration contexts, an ambiguous term or provision of the
INA should be interpreted so as to avoid serious doubts of constitu-
tionality when that construction is reasonable.323 Therefore, courts
could stop short of determining the constitutionality of state marriage
amendments and still find that they raise constitutional questions
serious enough to compel a refusal to recognize that they merit an
exception to the presumption of marriage validity. This might be seen
as a step down the same misguided path of implied definitions con-
ceptualized in Adams v. Howerton. On the other hand, one might
argue that the established canon of constructing ambiguous statutes
in order to avoid collisions with constitutional values outweighs the
traditional deference to state marriage law in the specific context of
constructing “marriage” and “spouse” under the INA, just as another
canon, the avoidance of internal conflict within the INA, once miti-
gated in favor of defining “marriage” to exclude homosexuality.
VI. OTHER STRATEGIES FOR RECOGNIZING SAME-SEX COUPLES
UNDER U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW
As this article demonstrates, the traditional and correct under-
standing of marriage under the INA defers to state family law to
determine marriage validity, and this procedure should control with
regard to same-sex marriage too, in the event that DOMA is repealed.
This consistent construction of the INA in its present and historic
form, however, does not mean that states will always be able to dic-
tate the consequences of immigration policy as it regards “marriage”
and “spouses.”
State definitions may be altered by express legislation in areas
within Congress’s purview, like immigration.324 The court in Adams
was correct to the extent it recognized that Congress clearly has the
authority, “within constitutional constraints,” to ignore state law
and expressly define the terms of U.S. immigration law, including
323. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (“ ‘It is a cardinal principle’ of
statutory interpretation, however, that when an Act of Congress raises a ‘serious doubt’
as to its constitutionality, ‘this Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.’ ” (quoting Crowell v.
Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932))).
324. Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d 1036, 1039 (9th Cir. 1982).
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“marriage,” as it pleases.325 Its use of the term without further expla-
nation or definition merely implies that it is recognizing the institu-
tion, as it has almost always been understood, as a creature of state
law. Assuming no constitutional violation, however, Congress is free
to pass legislation that redefines the words “marriage” and “spouse”
as it did in DOMA or to add other categories of immediate relatives,
such as the “permanent partners” in the currently pending UAFA.326
The United States Supreme Court has also repeatedly recognized
that discriminatory state marriage laws may be unconstitutional,
violating the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in other con-
texts.327 There are high-profile cases currently moving through the
federal courts that challenge the constitutionality of state marriage
discrimination against same-sex couples on just these grounds.328
A. The Proposed Uniting American Families Act
Some U.S. citizens may have no option of joining their foreign
same-sex spouses or partners abroad. Other married gay Americans,
however, do have the option of immigrating to another country to be
with their families, since at least nineteen countries around the world
recognize their relationships for immigration purposes.329
The countries that recognize same-sex couples for immigration
purposes do so in very different ways. For instance, Spain and South
Africa have recognized marriage for same-sex couples, and thereby
allow those couples to benefit from the same immigration provisions
325. Id.
326. Defense of Marriage Act §§ 3, 7, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (Sept. 21,
1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006)); Uniting American Families
Act of 2009 § 2, H.R. 1024, 11th Cong. (2009).
327. See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95 (1987) (finding that the right to marry
applies to prison inmates); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 381-82 (1978) (finding a
fundamental right to marry); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 373-74 (1971) (finding
that given the importance of marriage and the state’s monopoly of the process for granting
divorces, the Due Process Clause is violated when access to courts is denied to indigents
who cannot pay court fees and costs in divorce cases); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12
(1967) (finding that anti-miscegenation laws violate the Fourteenth Amendment). But
see Fiallo v. Levi, 406 F. Supp. 162, 167-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (“The possibility of joining
one’s closest family in the United States is a privilege granted by statute, not a right given
by the Constitution.”).
328. See, e.g., Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-17241, 2010 U.S. App. LEXIS 170, at *3
(9th Cir. 2010) (challenging California’s Proposition 8 as unconstitutional).
329. While they do not all recognize same-sex marriage, at least nineteen countries
allow their citizens to sponsor their same-sex spouses’ or partners’ immigration: Australia,
Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands,
New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, Israel,
and South Africa. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 151-71.
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that benefit opposite-sex spouses.330 On the other hand, Brazil and
Israel recognize same-sex relationships specifically in the context of
special immigration law provisions.331
The UAFA, a solution similar to the Brazilian and Israeli models,
has been proposed in every United States Congress since 2000.332 If
enacted, UAFA would not change the definitions of “marriage” or
“spouse” under the INA.333 Rather, “[i]t would add the term ‘per-
manent partner’ to [most] sections of the [INA] where ‘spouse’ now
appears.” 334 As UAFA currently stands, the one significant exception
would be with regard to dependent spouses of nonimmigrant visa
holders, who would still apparently have to resort to B-2 visitor visas
for the duration of their nonimmigrant stays in the United States.335
UAFA defines “permanent partner” as a foreign national who is
(1) at least eighteen years old; (2) in an intimate relationship with the
sponsoring adult U.S. citizen or permanent resident, “in which both
parties intend a lifelong commitment”; (3) “financially interdependent
with that” person; (4) “not married to or in a permanent partnership
with anyone” else; and (5) “unable to contract with that” sponsor a
marriage that is recognized under the INA.336
Representative Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) first introduced UAFA
(then known as the Permanent Partners Immigration Act) in the
House of Representatives in February 2000.337 He has reintroduced
it in every Congress since, and Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) has
introduced companion legislation in the Senate since 2003.338 When
UAFA was reintroduced in the current Congress, it had eighty original
cosponsors in the House and fifteen in the Senate,339 and it appears to
have more momentum than in the past. This February, the American
Bar Association passed a resolution calling on Congress to enact legis-
lation like UAFA, and the Senate Judiciary Committee finally held
hearings on the bill.340
330. Id. at 167-68.
331. Id. at 154, 161.
332. Id. at 145.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Immigration Equal ity ,  Visas for  Co-Habit ing  Partners,
http://www.immigrationequality.org/template.php?pageid=155 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010).
336. H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. (2009).
337. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 145.
338. Id.
339. See Immigration Equality, Current Co-Sponsors, http://www.immigrationequality
.org/template.php?pageid=152 (last visited Apr. 7, 2010) (providing links to cosponsor lists
for the House and Senate).
340. The Uniting Families Act: Addressing Inequality in Federal Immigration Law
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://judiciary
.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=3876.
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Although perhaps an even longer shot than the demise of DOMA,
UAFA would alleviate many of the obstacles preventing recognition
of same-sex relationships for immigration purposes.341 It would prob-
ably affect more couples than a repeal of DOMA, since most states
and foreign countries still do not recognize the marriages of same-
sex couples. On the other hand, UAFA would provide no additional
benefits for the spouses of foreign nationals who are temporarily work-
ing or studying in the United States.342 It might also be of limited use
for fiancés and spouses who have not been together long enough or do
not have the knowledge and financial wherewithal to qualify under
the higher level of scrutiny that USCIS would likely apply to couples
who cannot produce a marriage license.343
Of course, the premise of this article is that the federal definition
of “marriage” and “spouse” in DOMA may be repealed or struck down
by a court prior to, or in lieu of, passage of UAFA.
B. The Federal Constitutional Challenge to Marriage
Discrimination in General
In addition to the suits challenging the federal definition of mar-
riage in DOMA, a pending suit in a California federal court challenges
the constitutionality of marriage discrimination in general.344
In May of 2009, Perry v. Schwarzenegger was filed to challenge
the constitutionality of California’s marriage amendment under the
Equal Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the U.S. Constitution.345 This case made headlines not only
because of the importance of the issues involved, but also because of
the attorneys who filed it, Theodore Olsen and David Boies. Mr. Olsen
was Solicitor General under the George W. Bush administration and
Mr. Boies was President Clinton’s attorney during his impeachment
proceedings.346 Most famously, they represented the two opposing
sides in Bush v. Gore.347
While challenges to marriage discrimination against same-sex
couples have never before been successful in federal courts,348 there
341. Uniting American Families Act, H.R. 1024, 111th Cong. (2009).
342. FAMILY, UNVALUED, supra note 2, at 146.
343. Id.
344. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 09-17241, 2010 U.S. App. Lexis 170, at *4 (9th
Cir. 2010).
345. Leslie A. Gordon, Marriage Proposal: Prop 8 Suit Goes Federal, and that Worries
Same-Sex Marriage Advocates, A.B.A. J., Sept. 2009, at 18-20.
346. Id. at 18.
347. Id.
348. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S.
810 (1972). The United States Supreme Court’s decision to deny a hearing in Baker for
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are hopes today that the courts may view the issue differently in
light of Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas, two relatively recent
United States Supreme Court opinions that have shown a willing-
ness to review cases of discrimination on the basis of sexual orienta-
tion seriously and carefully, even if they did not employ traditional
Fourteenth Amendment strict scrutiny analysis.349 Plaintiffs in these
cases can also be encouraged by the sea change in state supreme court
decisions relating to marriage discrimination, particularly those that
applied heightened scrutiny to state laws discriminating on the
basis of sexual orientation.350
Perry does not directly focus on the question of federal recog-
nition of same-sex marriage. If the United States Supreme Court,
however, were to rule that discrimination in marriage against same-
sex couples violates the Fourteenth Amendment, it would likely toll
a death knell for discrimination at the federal level as well. The Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause applies to the federal government,
and the Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause has been
held incorporated through the Fifth Amendment to restrain the fed-
eral government as well.351 Of course, a victory in Perry would likely
invalidate state constitutional amendments and mini-DOMAs, as
well as the federal DOMA.
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is considered valid, binding precedent with regard to
the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution of state
court judgments prohibiting two people of the same sex from marrying. Adams v.
Howerton, 486 F. Supp. 1119, 1124 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff’d, Adams v. Howerton, 673 F.2d
1036 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977) (noting that
a Supreme Court summary affirmance “affirm[s] the judgment but not necessarily the
reasoning by which it was reached”). This summary decision, however, binds lower
courts only with regard to the holding of the case, not the reasoning of the affirmed
opinion. In re Kandu, 315 B.R. 123, 136 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 2004) (distinguishing a Fifth
Amendment challenge to federal marriage discrimination in the form of DOMA from the
Fourteenth Amendment challenge to a discriminatory state marriage law upheld in
Baker, before proceeding to uphold DOMA as well).
In In re Kandu, a federal Bankruptcy court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court’s approach
to the constitutional analysis of same-sex conduct . . . at least arguably appears to have
shifted.” Id. at 138 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586-606 (2003)). This is sig-
nificant because federal courts may arguably depart from cases summarily decided by
the Supreme Court if interceding “doctrinal developments indicate otherwise.” Hicks v.
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 344 (1975).
349. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 623-
24 (1996). But see Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578-79 (stressing that the case did “not involve
whether the government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual
persons seek to enter”); Kandu, 315 B.R. at 138 (applying rational basis review to uphold
the constitutionality of DOMA’s select federal discrimination against same-sex married
couples under Fifth Amendment Due Process and incorporated Equal Protection).
350. Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 880 (Iowa 2009).
351. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
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As with UAFA, this article is premised on the assumption that
DOMA may be repealed or struck down prior to a positive appellate
court decision in a case like Perry.
CONCLUSION
If DOMA were repealed or struck down, that would not result in
a clear, uniform rule recognizing all same-sex marriages under the
INA. There is, however, a wealth of guidance about how our immi-
gration system deals with marriages that are recognized in some, but
not all, U.S. states.
U.S. Attorneys General, the BIA, immigration officials, and most
federal courts have consistently applied the same standards to deter-
mine marriage validity under the INA. These standards have been
used in dozens of cases, including those involving biracial marriage,
marriage between close relatives, marriage involving minors, mar-
riage involving transgender spouses, proxy marriage, polygamy, and
even same-sex marriage before DOMA.
If valid where celebrated, a marriage is generally presumed to
be valid under U.S. immigration law as well. There are, however,
exceptions based on both state and federal public policy. If a couple’s
state of domicile has a very strong public policy objection to a partic-
ular category of marriage, as expressed through criminal sanctions
against the underlying relationship or sanctions against marriage
in another state as an evasion of the domicile’s marriage law, an
exception will be recognized under the INA. Four federal public
policy exceptions have also been recognized in the cases of unconsum-
mated proxy marriages, polygamy, “sham marriages,” and same-sex
marriage, all coinciding with express provisions in relevant federal
statutes indicating direct or indirect objection to a marriage or its
underlying relationship.
If DOMA is repealed or struck down, same-sex marriages should
be recognized under the INA so long as they are bona fide and valid
where celebrated and the couple’s state of domicile has no strong
public policy objection. If state law included an enforceable criminal
prohibition of cohabitation or evasion of state law to marry in another
jurisdiction, it could support an exception to the presumption of rec-
ognition. Since that is probably impossible in light of the United States
Supreme Court’s opinion in Lawrence v. Texas, state constitutional
amendments are the strongest and most specific constitutionally valid
expressions of state objection possible. That may be enough. Such
amendments, however, may also fail constitutional muster, or, at
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least, raise such constitutional concerns that federal courts will recog-
nize same-sex marriages under the INA, regardless of state public
policy objections.
A world without DOMA would be a more just place for all lesbian
and gay spouses. For gay Americans in binational couples, the demise
of DOMA could also mean an end to the daily choice between their
country and the people they love.
